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Non-technical summary and conclusions
This dissertation deals with non-welfaristic redistribution and exists out of three
papers:
Paper 1: Lorenz dominance and non-welfaristic redistribution.
Paper 2: Is it fair to ‘make work pay’?
Paper 3: Minimal rights based solidarity.
The first section presents non-welfaristic redistribution from a broad perspec-
tive. The main settings of the diﬀerent papers and the most important similar-
ities and diﬀerences between them are discussed in section two. Section three
explicitly turns to the research questions posed in this dissertation and summa-
rizes our main answers to them. Section four explores possible directions for
future research.
1 Broad orientation
Opinions tend to diﬀer strikingly concerning the redistributive role of the gov-
ernment. Individuals who think that economic success exemplified by a high
income primarily depends on hard work, being flexible, being mobile, willing to
take high risks, etc, usually oppose redistribution. Conversely, individuals who
believe that sex, race, family background, networking, etc, primarily determine
income diﬀerences usually favor redistribution (Fong (2001), Bowles and Gin-
tis (2002)). Politicians and central planners alike have to base the design of
redistributive mechanisms on important choices about which sources of income
inequalities entail a reason for redistribution because they are considered oﬀen-
sive and should be eliminated and about which sources of income inequalities
are socially acceptable. Therefore, a responsibility cut has to be drawn, i.e. a
fundamental distinction has to be made between factors for which individuals
should or should not be held responsible for (Dworkin (1981)). Here again, po-
litical disagreement arises on the location of the responsibility cut. Right wing
parties usually hold people responsible for a larger set of factors than left wing
parties do. Given these views, there is a clear tendency for the right wing to be
less supportive of redistribution, although on a theoretical level there is not nec-
essarily a monotonic relationship between the degree of responsibility assigned
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to individuals and the ideal level of redistribution (Cappelen and Tungodden
(2005)).
Exactly the idea of incorporating notions of responsibility into the design of
redistributive mechanisms constitutes the foundation of non-welfaristic theories
of distributive justice (see, among others, Dworkin (1981), Arneson (1989), Co-
hen (1989), Roemer (1993, 1996, 1998), Fleurbaey (1994, 1995a,b,c,d), Bossert
(1995), Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996), Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996, 1999),
Maniquet (1998)). These relatively recent theories have to be contrasted with
the traditional welfaristic redistributive theories which are based on the mea-
surement of subjective satisfaction in an interpersonally comparable way to
judge the desirability of diﬀerent social states. Departing from the prevail-
ing ideal of equalizing subjective welfare, a philosophical discussion originated
on what exactly constituted the proper equalisandum of non-welfaristic theo-
ries. Rawls (1971) first proposed to equalize resources. His resourcist theory
was supported by Dworkin (1981) but also diﬀerent alternatives in between
resources and subjective welfare such as functionings (Sen (1985)) or midfare
(Cohen (1989)) were proposed. Throughout this dissertation our equalisan-
dum is income. Given that the responsibility cut has been decided upon, the
goal of non-welfaristic redistribution of income is perhaps best summarized as
an attempt to design a redistribution mechanism that simultaneously satisfies
two requirements (Fleurbaey (1995a) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996)). On
the one hand, there is the principle of compensation (Fleurbaey (1995a)): two
individuals who are identical on all characteristics for which they are held re-
sponsible, and hence only diﬀer with respect to characteristics for which they
must be compensated, should receive an equal income after redistribution. This
principle implies that when all unequal characteristics are to be compensated, a
completely equal distribution of income is the goal. On the other hand, there is
the principle of responsibility (Barry (1991)), also called the principle of natural
reward (Fleurbaey (1995a)): two individuals with identical compensation char-
acteristics who only diﬀer with respect to characteristics for which they are held
responsible, should not be aﬀected by the redistribution process. This principle
implies that no individual should be extra rewarded by redistribution for exer-
cising her responsibility in a particular way. It also implies that if all individuals
have identical compensation characteristics there is no reason to perform any
redistribution at all.
At the heart of the literature on non-welfaristic income redistribution is the
observation that a tension exists between the principle of compensation and
the principle of responsibility (see Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2004) and the ref-
erences cited therein). In fact, in various contexts, axioms representing the
principle of compensation turn out to be incompatible with axioms representing
the principle of responsibility. Especially when the influence of compensation
characteristics is not separable from the influence of responsibility characteris-
tics in the determination of an individual’s income, transfers designed to fully
compensate for oﬀensive inequalities may alter the distribution of income in a
way that is no longer neutral with respect to rewarding diﬀerent degrees of re-
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sponsibility. As a result an ethical dilemma arises on which principle should be
given priority and which principle should be, possibly considerably, weakened
in order to allow for the existence of a redistribution mechanism. The literature
has produced a variety of (families of) redistribution mechanisms that either
satisfy the principle of compensation or the principle of responsibility.
Although theories of non-welfaristic redistribution of income are clearly based
on solid ethical principles, they take up a relatively small share of normative
public economics. Their modest popularity could be attributed to the fact
that most results are predominantly theoretical and that the implications and
workability of implementing non-welfaristic theory are not clearly understood
by more traditional analysts. As we clarify below, this dissertation studies in
depth some redistributive properties of particular non-welfaristic redistribution
mechanisms using traditional concepts from the analysis of income inequalities
and poverty. Furthermore, we show how feasible tax-benefit schemes could be
designed on the basis of social preferences that take ethical principles on the
compensation-responsibility tradeoﬀ into account. We also present some new
non-welfaristic redistribution mechanisms and study the corresponding income
distributions. By doing so we hope to have contributed in enlarging the set of
options available to policy makers confronted with compensation issues.
2 A brief exploration into non-welfaristic redis-
tribution
We do not address in this dissertation the question of how to sort individual
characteristics into responsibility and compensation factors and hence all papers
assume that a democratic process has fixed the responsibility cut. For theories
determining the location of the responsibility cut, we refer to Rawls (1971,
1975), Sen (1980), Dworkin (1981), Arneson (1989), Cohen (1989), Temkin
(1993), Fleurbaey (1998) and Devooght (2003) for an overview.
The environment in which non-welfaristic redistribution is studied in paper 1
and paper 3 is diﬀerent from the environment used in paper 2. The particu-
lar choice of framework crucially hinges upon the question whether behavioral
responses to redistribution are modelled or not. Paper 1 and paper 3 ignore
these incentive issues and the model basically describes the case where there is
no production and income can be freely transferred in order to compensate for
diﬀerences in compensation characteristics. In paper 2 individuals do respond
to redistribution and the basic model, which dates back to seminal contributions
of Mirrlees (1971) and Pazner and Schmeidler (1974), describes a production
environment. Individuals transform their input, in this case their labor, into
one output, in this case their income, sharing the same technology, i.e. hav-
ing the same pre-tax income function. Individuals diﬀer with respect to their
productive skills and with respect to their preferences towards labor time and
consumption. We briefly set up this basic production framework in a simplified
version, as it allows us to sketch some key concepts used in the diﬀerent papers.
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Consider a four type economy in which individuals {1, ..., n} have either a low or
a high innate skill s ∈ S = {sL, sH}, 0 < sL < sH and a low or a high taste for
working t ∈ T = {tL, tH}, 0 < tL < tH . Types are abbreviated st ∈ ST . Given
an amount of work ` ∈ [0, 1], income before redistribution y equals s` in the usual
multiplicative way. Income after redistribution (which is used for consumption)
c equals y − τ(y) with τ(y) the redistributive mechanism of the government
which is an income tax as the government typically only observes y (and not
s and t). Taste for working defines the marginal rate of substitution between
c and ` for preferences represented by a utility function ut(c, `). Graphically, t
determines the curvature of the individual’s indiﬀerence curves. The indiﬀerence
curves of a ‘lazy’ individual are steeper than the indiﬀerence curves of a ‘hard-
working’ individual as the former requires a larger increase in consumption in
order to be willing to work a little more. The following figure illustrates the









































Figure 1: Laisser-faire in a production economy
From a non-welfaristic point of view, this initial income distribution can only be
optimal when both s and t belong to the set of responsibility characteristics of
the individual and no compensation is needed. The ethical assumption that is
usually made is that individuals are held responsible for t but not for diﬀerences
in s. Hence, the principle of compensation applies to skills and demands to re-
distribute income such that the incomes after redistribution of types LL and
HL and the incomes after redistribution of types LH and HH are equalized re-
spectively. The principle of responsibility demands that diﬀerent preferences do
not obtain any diﬀerential treatment. In the construction of social preferences
where, besides fairness conditions, also eﬃciency considerations (like the Pareto
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principle) are taken into account and which are applied to design τ(y), incom-
patibilities between both principles arise. The contributions of, among others,
Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996, 1999, 2005a,b,c), Kolm (1996), Gaspart (1998)
and Maniquet (1998) are, like paper 2, devoted to the proposal of diﬀerent
solutions out of these negative results.
In the setting of paper 1 and paper 3 there is no production and redistribu-
tion is made via lump-sum transfers, here denoted λ. Hence, for an individual i,
ci equals λi+ yi and the government’s budget constraint is simply
Pn
i=1 λi = 0.
Note that we can move from the setting of paper 2 to the setting of paper 1
and paper 3 by assuming that in our production environment described above
utility functions ut(c, `) are quasi-linear in c, i.e. ut(c, `) = c − vt(`). What-
ever the amount of consumption the individual receives after redistribution, the
individual holds her labor supply fixed at her optimal labor time. Hence the
total sum of income before redistribution remains constant, irrespective of the
way income is redistributed over the population. This explains why the basic
model of paper 1 and paper 3 is often called the quasi-linear model. Impor-
tant contributions using quasi-linear models are, among others, Moulin (1994),
Bossert (1995), Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996), Iturbe (1997), Sprumont (1997),
Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van de gaer (1999) and Tungodden (2005). Let us con-
tinue using our four type economy. The compensation characteristic is s and the
responsibility characteristic is t and both determine income before redistribu-
tion. Assume that a higher skill or a higher taste for working leads to a higher
income, hence yLL is strictly smaller than yHL or yLH and yHH is strictly larger
than yHL or yLH . The principle of compensation requires that individuals with
the same taste for working but a diﬀerent skill end up having the same income
after redistribution, whereas the principle of responsibility requires that indi-
viduals with the same skill but a diﬀerent taste for working receive the same
transfer. The tension between both principles is easily demonstrated for our
four type economy. Consider the following linear system, where the first and
second equation represent the principle of compensation, the third and fourth





λLL + yLL = λHL + yHL
λLH + yLH = λHH + yHH
λLL = λLH
λHL = λHHP
st λst = 0
This system has no solution for almost all combinations of parameter values for
the diﬀerent y’s.
Two important families of non-welfaristic redistribution mechanisms that play
a central role in paper 1, the family of Egalitarian Equivalent mechanisms
(Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996)), named after the concept of egalitarian equiva-
lence introduced by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) and Fleurbaey (1995b), and
the family of Conditionally Egalitarian mechanisms (Bossert and Fleurbaey
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(1996)), named after the concept of conditional equality introduced by Roemer
(1993), respectively keep one principle intact and relax the other principle to
only hold for one specific value of the compensation or responsibility charac-
teristic, which is called the reference characteristic. In our four type economy
and assuming, for the sake of the argument, that the reference characteristic
is observed in the population, this is exemplified by dropping one of the first
four equations from the system. The sL(sH)-Egalitarian Equivalent mechanism
keeps the principle of compensation intact but the principle of responsibility
is only satisfied for individuals having a skill equal to the reference skill, in
this case sL(sH) (i.e. the fourth (third) equation is dropped from the system).
Similarly, the tL(tH)-Conditionally Egalitarian mechanism keeps the principle
of responsibility intact but the principle of compensation is only satisfied for
individuals having a taste for working equal to the reference taste, in this case
tL(tH) (i.e. the first (second) equation is dropped from the system).
Many propositions of redistribution mechanisms in the literature are accom-
panied with axiomatic characterizations, showing the logical links between dif-
ferent ethical principles expressed in diﬀerent axioms. An axiomatic approach
is adopted in paper 3. It can be shown that the principle of compensation
underlies the idea that changes in the population profile of compensation char-
acteristics should harm or benefit all individuals in the same direction. Diﬀerent
characterizations of diﬀerent redistribution mechanisms depend on the precise
way in which this solidarity principle is performed. A central observation to the
analysis in paper 3 is the relationship between the literature on fair income
redistribution and the literature on competing claims and bankruptcy prob-
lems (see Thomson (2003) and the references cited therein). In a competing
claims problem a fixed amount of money must be allocated on the basis of mon-
etary claims that sum up to more than can be divided. The objective is to
design allocation mechanisms that associate with each claims problem a divi-
sion of the amount available over the claimants. In the context of fair income
redistribution, a claim is interpreted as a reference income level, which equals
the income before redistribution an individual would receive when having the
reference compensation characteristic instead of her own compensation charac-
teristic. For example, in our four type economy, low skill type individuals LL
and LH could respectively claim the high skill type’s income levels yHL and
yHH , when sH is the reference skill. In this example the total sum of claims
exceeds the total sum of income before redistribution and a competing claims
problem arises. We show how the interplay between both strands of the liter-
ature in giving a precise interpretation to the solidarity principle leads to the
characterization of new families of redistribution mechanisms.
3 Research questions ... and answers
In order to implement a non-welfaristic redistribution mechanism, the normative
choice for a non-welfaristic social planner is not limited to deciding which fair-
ness principle, the principle of compensation or the principle of responsibility,
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is kept intact and which principle is weakened. Also a reference characteris-
tic needs to be chosen. Paper 1 studies the eﬀect of the choice of reference
characteristic on the income distributions resulting from Egalitarian Equivalent
and Conditionally Egalitarian mechanisms. The reason is that diﬀerent choices
of the reference characteristic might lead to considerable diﬀerences in income
inequalities, even for mechanisms belonging to the same family. Whether these
income inequalities matter to a non-welfaristic social planner is a normative
choice, but when there exist lower or upper bounds to the amount of redistri-
bution we want to perform —think for example of an undesirable redistribution
mechanism that forces a part of the population into deprivation— our analysis
may help to restrict the range of acceptable reference characteristics. Using the
Lorenz dominance partial ordering, the following research question is addressed:
*Is it possible to Lorenz order diﬀerent Egalitarian Equivalent mechanisms and/or
diﬀerent Conditionally Egalitarian mechanisms?,
and if the answer to this question is aﬃrmative,
*Which (empirical) information is needed to do so?
Only requiring that responsibility and compensation characteristics are comple-
ments or substitutes in the income generating process, we show that all Egal-
itarian Equivalent mechanisms can be Lorenz ordered. Conversely, diﬀerent
Conditionally Egalitarian mechanisms cannot be Lorenz ordered, nor can they
Lorenz dominate Egalitarian Equivalent mechanisms. Some Egalitarian Equiva-
lent mechanisms can Lorenz dominate all Conditionally Egalitarian mechanisms
but in the specific comparison of these mechanisms, diﬀerent income distribu-
tions can only be thoroughly compared when accurate empirical estimates of
the pre-tax income function and of the distributions of responsibility and com-
pensation characteristics are available.
In paper 2 we suggest that a fair allocation would arise if all individuals divided
and shared equally all resources, including productive skills. Of course, in the
context of income redistribution, labor market productivities such as intelligence
or handicaps are typically inalienable. Hence, we ask the question whether an
eﬃcient allocation exists where every individual is indiﬀerent between her bundle
and sharing all resources equally, or:
*Does a Pareto Eﬃcient and Shared Resources Equivalent allocation exist?
We show that such an allocation indeed exists and we use this allocation to
construct social preferences. Subsequently, these social preferences are applied
to design an optimal fair non-linear income tax scheme. We then ask:
*Does a fair income tax scheme exhibit negative marginal tax rates for the lower
incomes?
This is certainly a relevant policy question given the increased importance many
governments attach to ‘making work pay’ programs that aim at subsidizing
low income earners. We show that, for a given budget constraint, negative
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marginal tax rates cannot be optimal in the reasonable case in which at least
some unemployed are willing to work but cannot due to exogenous labor market
constraints.
In paper 3 we propose to use individuals’ minimal rights to divide an extra
amount of income generated by a change in the population profile of compensa-
tion characteristics. The minimal right of an individual equals the amount that
remains from the sum of income before redistribution when all other individuals
receive their claim. Priority is given to individuals with a higher claim once the
sum of income before redistribution exceeds threshold levels where individuals’
minimal rights become positive. We call this solidarity principle minimal rights
based solidarity and ask:
*Which families of non-welfaristic redistribution mechanisms satisfy minimal
rights based solidarity?
We characterize two diﬀerent families of Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mech-
anisms. One family guarantees each individual her claim when claims are feasi-
ble. The other family guarantees a non-negative income after redistribution for
all individuals.
4 Back to the future
As every new answer usually raises a multiple of new questions, it is not surpris-
ing that the topics dealt with in this dissertation still leave open some avenues
for future research.
As shown in paper 1 and paper 3, many non-welfaristic redistribution mecha-
nisms take the form of families. These families contain in themselves an infinity
of diﬀerent solutions with possibly very diﬀerent properties. The precise choice
of a member from such a family usually depends on the choice of a specific refer-
ence characteristic, which invokes additional ethical principles. In paper 1 there
is a concern for the way responsibility is rewarded, as some non-welfaristic redis-
tribution mechanisms might bring about income inequalities that are considered
too severe. However, very diﬀerent principles might be considered. Therefore,
our analysis in paper 1 might add some new insights, but a full-blown theory
about the choice of reference characteristic still needs to be developed.
The Pareto Eﬃcient and Shared Resources Equivalent allocation presented in
paper 2 is in itself an interesting research topic. A characterization of this so-
lution might reveal its ethical qualities and lead to a confrontation with related
solutions proposed in the literature. Furthermore, the Walrasian equilibrium
properties of sharing productive skills equally need to be studied. Our theo-
retical results in paper 2 on the optimal second best allocation in a four type
economy could be extended to the case of a general population. The calibra-
tion of the responsibility and compensation characteristic used in the simula-
tion is probably only one of many possible ways to turn specific concepts from
non-welfaristic theory into a computable framework. A general procedure to
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generate statistically independent (indexes of) responsibility and compensation
characteristics has not yet been proposed.
We use specific fairness principles in paper 2 to derive an optimal income tax
scheme. However, one could start from an actual tax scheme and the distri-
butions of personal characteristics and introduce fairness principles in marginal
tax reform.
The established similarities in paper 3 between the literature on non-welfaristic
redistribution and the literature on competing claims problems obviously open
up an array of new questions into finding further links. It is for example not hard
to show that, when there are only two claimants, the two families of Minimal
Rights based Egalitarian mechanisms presented in paper 3 are equivalent with
a mechanism called Concede-and-Divide. This mechanism is a widely accepted
procedure to adjudicate two conflicting claims and many well known n-person
rules coincide with Concede-and-Divide in the two claimants case (see Thomson
(2003) for an overview). We believe that solidarity based on minimal rights could
also be relevantly applied in a competing claims context: think for example
of correcting an allocation that was originally based on a wrong estimation
of the liquidation value of a bankrupt firm. The fact that our two families of
Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mechanisms have not yet been proposed in the
context of a competing claims problem illustrates that, although both strands
of the literature abundantly use axiomatic characterizations in proposing new
solutions, most axioms express very diﬀerent principles. A further examination
into which ethical principles could be transferred from one context to the other
might lead to proposals of new income redistribution mechanisms and/or new
bankruptcy rules.
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Lorenz dominance and non-welfaristic
redistribution∗
Roland Iwan Luttens†and Dirk Van de gaer‡
Abstract
Our concern is for income inequalities that may result from non-welfaristic
redistribution schemes. We show that for large classes of income functions
Lorenz dominance results can be found in the comparison of two egalitar-
ian equivalent mechanisms. Comparisons of diﬀerent conditionally egali-
tarian mechanisms only yield poverty dominance results. In general, no
egalitarian equivalent mechanism can be Lorenz dominated by a condi-
tionally egalitarian mechanism. Our analysis stresses the need for accurate
empirical estimates of the pre-tax income function and of the distributions
of responsibility and compensation characteristics.
JEL classification: D31, D63, H21, I32.
Keywords: non-welfaristic redistribution, Lorenz dominance.
1 Motivation
Recently, non-welfaristic income redistribution schemes are presented (Fleur-
baey (1994, 1995a), Bossert (1995), Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996)). These ax-
iomatically founded mechanisms are designed to fulfil to diﬀerent degrees the
fairness goal of compensating individuals for factors beyond their responsibility.
In that, they follow ideas of political philosophers like Dworkin (1981a,b), Arne-
son (1989) and Cohen (1989), who motivate egalitarians to criticize traditional
welfaristic theory, where the objective of the government is to maximize a social
welfare function based on the aggregation of individual utilities only, for ignor-
ing the issue of personal responsibility. Following Cohen, diﬀerent outcomes
should only be equalized when they are due to factors beyond control of the
∗We thank the Editor, Marc Fleurbaey and two anonymous referees, Geert Dhaene
and seminar/conference participants at UAP-workshop (Namur, 2003), ‘Welfarist and non-
welfarist approaches to public economics’ (Ghent, 2004), SED (Palma, 2004), SSC&W (Osaka,
2004) and IIPF (Milan, 2004) for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from
the Federal Public Planning Service Science Policy, Interuniversity Attraction Poles Program
- Belgian Science Policy [Contract No. P5/21] is gratefully acknowledged.
†SHERPPA, Ghent University, 9000 Ghent, Belgium, Roland.Luttens@UGent.be.
‡SHERPPA, Ghent University, 9000 Ghent, Belgium, Dirk.Vandegaer@UGent.be.
13
individual. Conversely, diﬀerences due to diﬀerential eﬀort are morally accept-
able. These ideas have smoothed the path for non-welfaristic theory, where one
has to collect non-utility information such as expended eﬀort to express a social
judgement. However, these considerations have given rise to the compensation
problem (extensively surveyed in Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2004)). Within the
context of first best income redistribution and without separability assumptions
on the pre-tax income function, no solution can at the same time assure equal
incomes to individuals with equal responsibility characteristics, while guaran-
teeing equal transfers to individuals with equal compensation characteristics
(Fleurbaey (1995b), Bossert (1995)). The redistribution mechanisms of Bossert
and Fleurbaey (1996), namely the egalitarian equivalent mechanism and the
conditionally egalitarian mechanism, following Pazner and Schmeidler (1978)
and Fleurbaey (1995a), are derived from relaxing either one of these axioms.
There exists a related literature on equality of opportunity, that proposes criteria
to evaluate redistribution schemes. Roemer’s (1993, 1998) criterion advocates
redistribution schemes that maximize a weighted average of the lowest income
achieved for each value of the responsibility characteristic. Van de gaer’s (1993)
criterion computes for every group of individuals with an equal compensation
characteristic the weighted average of their incomes over all values of the re-
sponsibility characteristic and advocates redistribution schemes that maximize
this lowest weighted average. With these criteria a complete ordering of diﬀer-
ent redistribution schemes is obtained and axiomatic characterizations of these
criteria have been provided (Bossert et al. (1999), Ooghe et al. (2005)). Based
on opportunity equalizing transfers, Peragine (2004) develops dominance crite-
ria that have a strong analogy with the traditional Lorenz dominance ordering.
His methodology provides an incomplete ranking of redistribution mechanisms
from a perspective of equality of opportunity.
The main goal of our analysis is diﬀerent. We examine the consequences of egal-
itarian equivalent and conditional egalitarian redistribution on income inequal-
ities. We believe that a concern for income inequality is — even for opportunity
egalitarians — legitimate for a number of reasons. Performing a non-welfaristic
redistribution exercise may result in inequalities that are too harsh. Our ethical
intuition may lead us to consider a limit to the kind and amount of penalty indi-
viduals should endure for exercising low responsibility. At least the satisfaction
of their basic needs should be guaranteed (Fleurbaey (1995b)). Moreover, some
caution on the amount of redistribution is advisable whenever informational
diﬃculties hamper the determination of personal responsibility. Statistical dif-
ficulties may render the latter even more diﬃcult in empirical applications.
Furthermore, the implementation of an egalitarian equivalent mechanism or a
conditionally egalitarian mechanism requires the choice of a reference character-
istic. Given the above-mentioned reasons, a non-welfaristic social planner may
take income inequalities or poverty into consideration when choosing a precise
reference characteristic. Our analysis may therefore help to restrict the range
of admissible reference characteristics and add some new insights to the theory
about the choice of particular reference characteristics within diﬀerent families
14
of non-welfaristic redistribution schemes.
In this paper we attempt to order egalitarian equivalent mechanisms and condi-
tionally egalitarian mechanisms on the basis of standard distributional criteria
such as Lorenz dominance (following the fundamental contribution of Atkinson
(1970)) and poverty dominance (following the pioneering work by Sen (1976)).
As explained before, our particular concern for the poorest is prompted by the
harsh penalties non-welfaristic redistribution may provoke.
This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we introduce the pre-tax income
function, discuss the goal of non-welfaristic redistribution, present the egali-
tarian equivalent mechanism and the conditionally egalitarian mechanism and
explain the criteria of Lorenz dominance and poverty dominance to compare dif-
ferent income distributions. In section 3 we impose some minimal assumptions
on the pre-tax income function in order to keep the analysis as general as pos-
sible. Without making distributional assumptions on individual’s responsibility
and compensation characteristics, we compare the income distributions of two
diﬀerent egalitarian equivalent mechanisms, two diﬀerent conditionally egalitar-
ian mechanisms and an egalitarian equivalent mechanism versus a conditionally
egalitarian mechanism. We check whether under one of the two mechanisms
both the poorest do not get poorer while the richest do not get richer. After
taking this necessary condition for Lorenz dominance into consideration, only
the comparison of an egalitarian equivalent mechanism with a conditionally
egalitarian mechanism remains undecided. Additional information is needed, so
in section 4 we present a specific example, which illustrates the results derived
in the previous section but at the same time allows us to draw more precise
conclusions: possible poverty dominance between two conditionally egalitarian
mechanisms is examined and also the comparison of an egalitarian equivalent
mechanism with a conditionally egalitarian mechanism is revisited. Section 5
summarizes our main conclusions.
2 Non-welfaristic redistribution mechanisms
The model presented here is taken from Bossert (1995). Suppose that in a popu-
lation N = {1, ..., n}, n ≥ 2, person i’s (i ∈ N) individual characteristics vector
ai can be partitioned into two vectors: a
R
i ∈ ΩR, representing the individual’s
responsibility characteristics, and aSi ∈ ΩS , representing her compensation char-
acteristics. The set of all possible characteristics vectors is Ω = ΩR×ΩS , where
ΩR ⊆ Rr, ΩS ⊆ Rs and ΩR, ΩS 6= ∅. The characteristics profile is given by
A = (a1, ...,an) ∈ Ωn. Denote f : Ω → R++ : a = (aR,aS) → f(a) an income
function, assigning pre-tax income to each possible characteristics vector and let
F be the set of all possible pre-tax income functions. An economy is described
by E = (A,f). Denote D = Ωn × F the set of all economies. A redistribution
mechanism F : D → Rn : E → [F1(E), ..., Fn(E)] maps an economy into an




i=1 f(ai),∀E ∈ D. The set of
all possible redistribution mechanisms is denoted z.
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The goal of non-welfaristic income redistribution is to preserve the eﬀect of
responsibility characteristics and to eliminate the influence of compensation
characteristics. Revelatory work of Fleurbaey (1994, 1995b) and Bossert (1995)
elucidates the compensation problem: unless the income function is additively
separable in aR and aS , no redistribution mechanism can only but fully com-
pensate for diﬀerentials in aS . Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) relax some of the
axioms underlying this impossibility result to derive the two families of solu-
tions at the heart of our research, the egalitarian equivalent mechanism and
the conditionally egalitarian mechanism. They are designed to fully accomplish
one of the two goals (respectively compensation and responsibility), while the
other goal is only fulfilled for a so called ‘reference’ vector. Denote FEE,a˜
S
(E)
the egalitarian equivalent mechanism where a˜S ∈ ΩS is the reference compensa-
tion characteristics vector. Similarly, FCE,a˜
R
(E) is the conditionally egalitarian
mechanism where a˜R ∈ ΩR is the reference responsibility characteristics vector.
Our purpose is to evaluate these redistribution mechanisms, using the traditional
concepts of Lorenz dominance and poverty dominance. The following subsec-
tions explain FEE,a˜
S
(E), FCE,a˜R(E) and the criteria of Lorenz dominance and
poverty dominance in more detail.
2.1 The egalitarian equivalent mechanism
The egalitarian equivalent mechanism FEE,a˜
S
(E) gives, for all E ∈ D, each
individual k ∈ N the following income:
FEE,a˜
S







S)− f(aRi ,aSi )
¢
. (1)
With this mechanism, every individual has a post-tax income equal to the pre-
tax income she would earn if her compensation characteristics were a˜S , plus
a uniform transfer. Two egalitarian equivalent mechanisms only diﬀer in the
choice of a˜S . This choice determines the reward scheme for responsibility, i.e.
it determines the magnitude of income diﬀerences due to diﬀerences in aR.
This mechanism satisfies the strong compensation axiom of ‘group solidarity in
aS ’: any variation in some individual’s compensation characteristics is equally
borne by all individuals. At the same time, only the weaker responsibility axiom
of ‘equal transfer for a˜S ’ is satisfied. This implies that there is no reason to
perform any redistribution only when everybody’s compensation characteristics
are equal to a˜S .
2.2 The conditionally egalitarian mechanism
The conditionally egalitarian mechanism FCE,a˜
R
(E) gives, for all E ∈ D, each










With this mechanism, every individual has a post-tax income equal to the av-
erage pre-tax income that would prevail if everyone in society has aR = a˜R. If
the individual deviates from this reference level, she alone bears the resulting
diﬀerence. Two conditionally egalitarian mechanisms only diﬀer in the choice
of a˜R. This choice determines the magnitude of diﬀerences in transfers due to
diﬀerences in aS .
This mechanism only satisfies the weaker compensation axiom of ‘equal income
for a˜R’: income equality is only required if all individuals have responsibility
characteristics equal to a˜R. This mechanism also satisfies the strong responsi-
bility axiom of ‘individual monotonicity in aR’. This means that a change in
one individual’s responsibility characteristics only aﬀects this person’s post-tax
income.
2.3 Lorenz dominance and poverty dominance
We briefly discuss the concepts of Lorenz dominance and poverty dominance (see
respectively Lambert (2001) and Zheng (2000) for details).1 The set of income
distributions with support [y, y] is Γ = {G : [y, y] → [0, 1]|G is nondecreasing,
G(y) = 0 and G(y) = 1}. Let GXE ∈ Γ be the income distribution that results
from redistribution mechanism FX(E) ∈ z. Mean income µ(E) = R y
y
ydGXE (y)
is independent of the redistribution mechanism. With every income level y
there corresponds a rank p ∈ [0, 1] identified by p = GXE (y). For every p-
value, define yXE (p) as the inverse function of G
X
E evaluated at p. The Lorenz





xdGXE (x). An income distribution G
A
E ∈ Γ Lorenz
dominates an income distribution GBE ∈ Γ if and only if LAE (p) ≥ LBE (p) for all
p and LAE 6= LBE . Let FA(E), FB(E) ∈ z. Define the function SA;BE : [y, y] →
R : y → SA;BE (y) =
R y
y
(GBE (x) − GAE (x))dx. The Lorenz dominance partial
ordering ÂL is a binary relation on z applied to a given economy E such that
FA(E) ÂL FB(E) if and only if SA;BE (y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ [y, y] and there exists
y ∈ [y, y] such that SA;BE (y) > 0. A necessary condition for Lorenz dominance is
that, at the same time, the poorest are not poorer and the richest are not richer
under FA(E) compared to FB(E). If we fail to establish Lorenz dominance
results, one next step could be to look for more complete orderings.2 Instead,
we look at poverty dominance.
1The normative implications of Lorenz dominance results in terms of social welfare are
well known since the influential work of Kolm (1969) and Atkinson (1970). However, for a
non-welfarist concerned with income inequality this welfarist underpinning is not essential.
2This requires the imposition of axioms, such as the transfer sensitivity axiom (Shorrocks
and Foster (1987)), that are less generally accepted (Lambert (2001)).
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Denote the poverty line separating the poor from the nonpoor by z ∈ [y, y]. Let
z be the highest poverty line considered. The first order poverty dominance
partial ordering ÂP1,z is a binary relation on z applied to a given economy
E such that FA(E) ÂP1,z FB(E) if and only if GAE (y) ≤ GBE (y) for all y ∈
[y, z] and there exists y ∈ [y, z] such that GAE (y) 6= GBE (y). The second order
poverty dominance partial ordering ÂP2,z is a binary relation on z applied to
a given economy E such that FA(E) ÂP2,z FB(E) if and only if SA;BE (y) ≥ 0
for all y ∈ [y, z] and there exists y ∈ [y, z] such that SA;BE (y) > 0. Clearly, first
order poverty dominance implies second order poverty dominance. Furthermore,
Lorenz dominance implies second order poverty dominance but not the other
way around. Therefore, and since non-welfarists might be concerned about
poverty (see section 1), if we fail to establish Lorenz dominance results between
two mechanisms, we see whether we can prove poverty dominance or not.
3 Distributional analysis: general framework
In this section, we state Lorenz dominance results with respect to the diﬀerent
non-welfaristic redistribution mechanisms in general terms. First, we define two
large classes of pre-tax income functions which we use to define domains for
redistribution mechanisms. Successively, we compare the income distributions
of two egalitarian equivalent mechanisms with diﬀerent reference compensation
characteristics, the income distributions of two conditionally egalitarian mecha-
nisms with diﬀerent reference responsibility characteristics and the income dis-
tributions of an egalitarian equivalent mechanism and a conditionally egalitarian
mechanism. We search for dominance results that hold for any economy in the
domains defined. This implies that the results we obtain are valid over all dis-
tributions of responsibility and compensation characteristics, since no explicit
assumptions on these distributions are stated. We conclude this section with
some remarks.
3.1 Assumptions on the distributions of aR and aS and on
the pre-tax income function
We consider the case where aR and aS are scalars instead of vectors. The lowest
and highest values of aR are respectively denoted aR and aR. Similarly, the low-
est and highest values of aS are respectively denoted aS and aS . Furthermore,
we require that aR and aS are not equal to aR and aS respectively. The set
of all possible characteristics vectors (aR, aS) that have these properties is Ω0.
The characteristics profile is given by A0 ∈ Ω0n .
The pre-tax income function f is continuously diﬀerentiable to the required









For all pre-tax income functions having properties (3) and (4), the poorest have
characteristics (aR, aS), while the richest have characteristics (aR, aS).
If ∂
2f(aR,aS)
∂aR∂aS equals 0 for all (a
R, aS) ∈ [aR, aR]× [aS , aS ], both the egalitarian
equivalent mechanism and the conditionally egalitarian mechanism reduce to
‘the natural redistribution mechanism’, which assigns the income due to an
individual’s aR entirely to that individual and divides the total income due to
aS equally among all individuals (Bossert (1995)). In this case all egalitarian
equivalent mechanisms and all conditionally egalitarian mechanisms lead to the
same income distribution.




and for at least one value of (aR, aS) ∈ [aR, aR] × [aS , aS ] the inequality holds
strict.




and for at least one value of (aR, aS) ∈ [aR, aR] × [aS , aS ] the inequality holds
strict.
F+ (F−) is the class of income functions for which aR and aS are complements
(substitutes) in the income generating process.4 As such, these classes are easy
to interpret. Moreover, whether f belongs to F+, F− or neither is essentially
an empirical issue. For these classes of income functions, it is straightforward
to test statistically to which class the income function belongs.
Our goal is to look for Lorenz dominance results for diﬀerent non-welfaristic
redistribution mechanisms over all economies E 0 = (A0, f) in the domains D+ =
Ω0
n ×F+ or D− = Ω0n ×F−.
3Conditional upon monotonicity, assumptions (3) and (4) are a matter of measurement.
If, for example, we only have information on handicaps, assumption (4) can be satisfied by
redefining the information in terms of ‘lack of ... (handicap)’.
4Restrictions on cross derivatives are not uncommon in the dominance literature, e.g.,
Hadar and Russell (1974) or Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982).
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3.2 Two egalitarian equivalent mechanisms
First, the following lemma identifies the poorest and richest individuals under
an egalitarian equivalent mechanism FEE,a˜
S
(E 0).
Lemma 1 : For an economy E 0 with A0 ∈ Ω0n and f satisfying (3), under
FEE,a˜
S
(E 0) the poorest have responsibility characteristic aR and the richest have




(E 0) consists of an individual specific part f(aRk , a˜S) plus a
uniform transfer. By (3), f(aR, a˜S) is increasing in aR.
The following proposition states that, depending on the economy concerned, the
egalitarian equivalent mechanism with the lower (higher) reference compensa-
tion characteristic Lorenz dominates the egalitarian equivalent mechanism with
the higher (lower) reference compensation characteristic.
Proposition 1 : ∀a˜S1 , a˜S2 ∈ [aS , aS ]:
∀E 0 ∈ D+: a˜S1 < a˜S2 ⇔ FEE,a˜
S
1 (E 0) ÂL FEE,a˜S2 (E 0),
∀E 0 ∈ D−: a˜S1 < a˜S2 ⇔ FEE,a˜
S
2 (E 0) ÂL FEE,a˜S1 (E 0).
Proof. (⇒) Compare FEE,a˜S1 (E 0) and FEE,a˜S2 (E 0) with a˜S1 , a˜S2 ∈ [aS , aS ]
and a˜S1 < a˜
S
2 . Using (1), the income diﬀerence for an individual k between the
two mechanisms F
EE,a˜S1
k (E 0)− FEE,a˜
S
2
k (E 0) equals
f(aRk , a˜
S
























i ) = 0,
(ii) by (4) and (a˜S1 < a˜
S




1 )− f(aRk , a˜S2 ) < 0,
(iii) for D+: by (5), φ(aRk ) is non increasing in a
R
k , and
(iv) for D−: by (6), φ(aRk ) is non decreasing in a
R
k .
Combining (i), (ii) and (iii) ensures that forD+ there exists aR+ ∈ (aR, aR), such




k ) > (<) 0. Hence, individuals with a
R
k < (>) a
R
+
receive more (less) income under FEE,a˜
S
1 (E 0) than under FEE,a˜S2 (E 0). So there
are transfers of income from individuals with a high aR to individuals with a
low aR. Since FEE,a˜
S
(E 0) exists of an individual specific part f(aRk , a˜S) plus a
uniform transfer, income is increasing in aR. This implies that all transfers go
from rich to poor. As a result FEE,a˜
S
1 (E 0) Lorenz dominates FEE,a˜S2 (E 0).
Combining (i), (ii) and (iv) ensures that forD− there exists aR− ∈ (aR, aR), such




k ) < (>) 0. Hence, individuals with a
R
k < (>) a
R
−
receive less (more) income under FEE,a˜
S
1 (E 0) than under FEE,a˜S2 (E 0). So there
are transfers of income from individuals with a low aR to individuals with a high
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aR, that is all transfers go from poor to rich. As a result FEE,a˜
S




(⇐) For D+. When FEE,a˜S1 (E 0) ÂL FEE,a˜S2 (E 0) and a˜S1 6= a˜S2 , the poorest have
a higher income under FEE,a˜
S
1 (E 0) than under FEE,a˜S2 (E 0) and the richest have
a higher income under FEE,a˜
S
2 (E 0) than under FEE,a˜S1 (E 0). Both conditions
only hold together when f(a¯R, a˜S1 )− f(aR, a˜S1 ) < f(a¯R, a˜S2 )− f(aR, a˜S2 ). Given
(5), this can only be true when a˜S1 < a˜
S
2 . The proof for D
− is analogous.
Note that proposition 1 is instructive for the choice of a˜S , since this choice
determines the inequality in the resulting income distribution.
3.3 Two conditionally egalitarian mechanisms
First, the following lemma identifies the poorest and richest individuals under
a conditionally egalitarian mechanism FCE,a˜
R
(E 0).
Lemma 2 : For an economy E 0 in D+, under FCE,a˜R(E 0) the poorest have
characteristics (aR, aS) and the richest have characteristics (aR, aS). For an
economy E 0 in D−, under FCE,a˜R(E 0) the poorest have characteristics (aR, aS)
and the richest have characteristics (aR, aS).
Proof. For D+ or D−, employing (3), ∂F
CE,a˜R(E0)
∂aR > 0, so the poorest
have aR and the richest have aR. Under FCE,a˜
R
(E 0) the poorest have the
smallest value of f(aR, aS)− f(a˜R, aS), while the richest have the highest value
of f(aR, aS)− f(a˜R, aS). For D+, due to (5), the poorest and the richest have
aS . For D−, due to (6), the poorest and the richest have aS .
From lemma 2 and lemma 1, for any economy in D+ or D−, the poorest and the
richest under a conditionally egalitarian mechanism are also among the poorest
and richest under an egalitarian equivalent mechanism.
The following proposition states that there is no Lorenz dominance between two
diﬀerent conditionally egalitarian mechanisms.
Proposition 2 : There does not exist E 0 ∈ (D+ ∪D−) and a˜R1 , a˜R2 ∈ [aR, aR] :
FCE,a˜
R
1 (E 0) ÂL FCE,a˜R2 (E 0).
Proof. Compare FCE,a˜
R
1 (E 0) and FCE,a˜R2 (E 0) with a˜R1 < a˜R2 and a˜R1 , a˜R2 ∈
[aR, aR]. Using (2), the income diﬀerence for an individual k between the two
mechanisms F
CE,a˜R1
k (E 0)− FCE,a˜
R
2
k (E 0) equals
f(a˜R2 , a
S
























i ) = 0,
(ii) by (3) and (a˜R1 < a˜
R




k )− f(a˜R1 , aSk ) > 0,
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(iii) for D+: by (5), ϕ(aSk ) is non decreasing in a
S
k ,
(iv) for D−: by (6), ϕ(aSk ) is non increasing in a
S
k .
Combining (i), (ii) and (iii) ensures that for D+ there exists aS+ ∈ (aS , aS), such




k ) < (>) 0. Hence, individuals with a
S
k < (>) a
S
+
receive less (more) income under FCE,a˜
R
1 (E 0) than under FCE,a˜R2 (E 0). So there
are transfers of income from individuals with a low aS to individuals with a
high aS . From lemma 2, the poorest and the richest individuals gain from the
transfers, making Lorenz dominance impossible.
Combining (i), (ii) and (iv) ensures that for D− there exists aS− ∈ (aS , aS), such




k ) > (<) 0. Hence, individuals with a
S
k < (>) a
S
−
receive more (less) income under FCE,a˜
R
1 (E 0) than under FCE,a˜R2 (E 0). So there
are transfers of income from individuals with a high aS to individuals with a
low aS . From lemma 2, the poorest and the richest individuals gain from the
transfers, making Lorenz dominance impossible.
Remark that for any economy in D+ or D− the poorest gain income from the
change of a conditionally egalitarian mechanism with a higher a˜R to a condi-
tionally egalitarian mechanism with a lower a˜R. This suggests that results in
terms of poverty dominance might be drawn, but more assumptions on the pre-
tax income function are needed. We come back to this issue within our specific
framework in subsection 4.2.
3.4 EE versus CE
First, the following remark excludes one particular comparison from D+ and
D−, because the incomes of the poorest and the richest remain unchanged.5
Remark : For D+ (D−), the incomes of the poorest and the richest remain
unchanged in the comparison of FEE,a˜
S
(E 0) with a˜S = aS (aS) and FCE,a˜R(E 0)



















(E 0) with a˜S ∈ [aS , aS ] and FCE,a˜R(E 0) with a˜R ∈
[aR, aR]. Using (1) and (2), the income diﬀerence for an individual k between
the two mechanisms FEE,a˜
S
k (E 0)− FCE,a˜
R
k (E 0) equals
C +E = ψ(aRk , a
S
k )
where C = f(aRk , a˜

















Using lemma 1 and 2, the proof boils down to showing that:
for D+: ψ(aR, aS) = ψ(aR, aS) = 0 when a˜S = aS and a˜R is chosen such that
f(a˜R, aS) = −E, and
5In order to derive Lorenz dominance results, further assumptions on the distributions of
responsibility and compensation characteristics have to be made. We illustrate this specific
comparison in the numerical example in subsection 4.3.
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for D−: ψ(aR, aS) = ψ(aR, aS) = 0 when a˜S = aS and a˜R is chosen such that
f(a˜R, aS) = −E.
Excluding the comparison described in the remark, the following proposition
states that a conditionally egalitarian mechanism does not Lorenz dominate an
egalitarian equivalent mechanism.
Proposition 3 : Excluding the comparison described in the remark, there does
not exist E 0 ∈ (D+ ∪D−), a˜R ∈ [aR, aR] and a˜S ∈ [aS , aS ] :
FCE,a˜
R
(E 0) ÂL FEE,a˜S (E 0).
Proof. Reconsider C, E and ψ(aRk , a
S
k ) as defined in the previous proof.






i ) = 0.
E is the same for all individuals. Without further assumptions on the pre-tax
income function, E can be either positive or negative. Anyhow, the individuals
that gain from the change of FCE,a˜
R
(E 0) to FEE,a˜S (E 0) have a larger C than
those who lose from it.
Divide the population in two groups: group 1 comprises all individuals with
aSk ≤ a˜S , group 2 all individuals with aSk ≥ a˜S . From lemma 2, the poorest and
the richest belong to group 2 for any economy in D+ and to group 1 for any
economy in D−.











≤ 0 for group 2. There exists
a`R+(a˜
R, a˜S , aS) ∈ R such that, if aRk < (>) a`R+, ψ(aRk , aS) > (<) 0. Hence,
individuals with aRk < (>) a`
R
















≤ 0 for group 1. There exists
a`R−(a˜
R, a˜S , aS) ∈ R such that, if aRk < (>) a`R−, ψ(aRk , aS) > (<) 0. Hence,
individuals with aRk < (>) a`
R





If respectively a`R+, a`
R
− ∈ [aR, aR], the poorest do not become poorer and the rich-
est do not become richer under FEE,a˜
S
(E 0) than under FCE,a˜R(E 0). Therefore,
the necessary condition for Lorenz dominance of FEE,a˜
S
(E 0) over FCE,a˜R(E 0)
is fulfilled, implying that the necessary condition for Lorenz dominance of
FCE,a˜
R
(E 0) over FEE,a˜S (E 0) is violated, proving the proposition.
The proof shows the possibility that the poorest do not become poorer and the
richest do not become richer under an egalitarian equivalent mechanism than
under a conditionally egalitarian mechanism. However, this condition implicitly
requires further assumptions on the pre-tax income function. If respectively
a`R+, a`
R
− /∈ [aR, aR], the incomes of the poorest and the richest change in the
same direction making Lorenz dominance results between egalitarian equivalent
mechanisms and conditionally egalitarian mechanisms impossible. We come
back to this issue in subsection 4.3.
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3.5 Remarks
Remark that the validity of propositions 1-3 only holds for any economy in D+
or D−, in the case where the responsibility and compensation characteristic
are one-dimensional. Extending these limiting assumptions greatly enlarges the
diﬃculty to obtain clear results.
Within the case where aR or aS are scalars, Lorenz dominance results are hard
to establish. Extensions to the case where aR and aS are vectors lead to even
fewer dominance results. Under multidimensional versions of (3), (4) and (5) or
(6), requiring that the derivatives of the pre-tax income function with respect
to every element in the aR- and aS-vectors are positive and the cross deriva-
tives have equal sign, an unambiguous comparison of two diﬀerent egalitarian
equivalent mechanisms along the lines of proposition 1 can only be made when
every element in a˜S changes in the same direction.
Restricting the analysis to income functions in F+ and F− drives the positive
result of proposition 1. A natural question is whether we can derive Lorenz
dominance results for the comparison of two conditionally egalitarian mecha-
nisms by restricting the analysis to other classes of income functions. Suppose




∂aR∂aS ≤ 0 for small values of a
R, ∂
2f(aR,aS)
∂aR∂aS ≥ 0 for large values of a
R and
∂3f(aR,aS)
∂2aR∂aS ≥ 0. Denote this class of income functions F±. The poorest gain
income and the richest lose income if a˜R of the new conditionally egalitarian
mechanism is lower than a˜R of the old conditionally egalitarian mechanism.
Indeed, the transfers going to the poorest increase as a˜R decreases, while the
transfers going to the richest decrease as a˜R decreases. However, this result
only holds if, under both mechanisms, the poorest have characteristics (aR, aS)
and the richest have characteristics (aR, aS). This does not apply for all income
functions in F±, making Lorenz dominance results only possible over suitably
defined domains.
4 Distributional analysis: example
In this section, we illustrate our previous results with an example, based on
a framework adopted in Schokkaert et al. (2004), following Atkinson (1995).
Closed form solutions for the pre-tax income function and the diﬀerent non-
welfaristic redistribution mechanisms are derived. We show that the pre-tax
income function belongs to F+, which automatically enables us to draw corol-
laries from propositions 1-3, since we assume that the distributional assumptions
of domain D+ also hold true. However, this example enables us to draw more
precise results with respect to poverty dominance between two conditionally
egalitarian mechanisms. Irrespective of the distributions of individual char-
acteristics, an upper bound poverty line is determined below which poverty
is reduced under one of the two mechanisms. Finally, the comparison of an
egalitarian equivalent mechanism with a conditionally egalitarian mechanism
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is revisited. We show which egalitarian equivalent mechanisms are eligible to
Lorenz dominate which conditionally egalitarian mechanisms in our example.
Introducing specific assumptions on the distributions of personal characteris-
tics, a numerical example shows the necessity of making these assumptions in
order to state exact dominance results.
4.1 Responsibility versus compensation
Suppose individuals diﬀer in only two dimensions: their pure preference for
leisure e and their innate skill level w. We assume that individuals can be
held responsible for diﬀerences in e, while at the same time compensation is
desirable for diﬀerences in w. We suppose that both variables have finite support
0 < e ≤ e ≤ 1 and 0 < w ≤ w ≤ 1 respectively, but we exclude the possibility
that e equals 1 and w equals 1. For convenience6, we assume that e and w are
distributed independently with density functions gE : [e, 1] → R+ : e → gE(e)
and gW : [w, 1]→ R+ : w → gW (w). All distributions of characteristics (gE, gW )
that satisfy these properties belong to Ω◦, which is equivalent to Ω0 with a
continuum of individuals and the additional assumption of independence.
4.1.1 The pre-tax income function belongs to F+
In our first best setting, we rule out behavioural responses: every individual
chooses her labor supply as if there were no redistribution, or alternatively the
government has complete information on individual behaviour and is able to
enforce this behaviour.
Suppose labor supply is iso-elastic:
L = eεwε (7)
where ε is the constant elasticity of labor supply, a measure for the eﬃciency
cost of the tax and assumed to be identical for all individuals.
Using (7), pre-tax income f as a function of e and w equals:
f(e, w) = wL = eεwε+1. (8)
Pre-tax income is increasing in both e and w, implying that the laziest, lowest





the pre-tax income function belongs to F+.
In this section, we search for Lorenz dominance results of diﬀerent non-welfaristic
redistribution mechanisms over the following domain:
D◦ : the set of all economies E◦ with (gE, gW ) ∈ Ω◦ and f(e, w) given by (8).
6Furthermore, it is doubtful that agents should be held responsible for characteristics which
are determined by characteristics that require compensation.
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4.1.2 The egalitarian equivalent mechanism









For all E◦ ∈ D◦, each individual k receives under an egalitarian equivalent
mechanism FEE,w˜(E◦) an income:





(f(e, w˜)− f(e,w)) gE(e)gW (w)dedw
= eεkw˜
ε+1 − µE(ε)w˜ε+1 + µE(ε)µW (ε+ 1) (9)
where w˜ denotes the reference compensation characteristic.
When w˜ equals 0, income is equally distributed. However, a non-welfaristic
social planner will not choose w˜ equal to 0, since this completely eliminates
the impact of responsibility on received income, which clearly conflicts with
the goal of non-welfaristic redistribution. Throughout, we assume that w˜ is
chosen between [w, 1]. It deserves mentioning that in order to avoid the delicate
choice of w˜, Fleurbaey (1995a) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) propose an
average version of the egalitarian equivalent mechanism (FAEE(E◦)). The idea
is to use every value of w ∈ [w, 1] successively as w˜ and to give each individual
the average of the resulting incomes she would obtain under these diﬀerent
FEE,w˜(E◦). However, it can be easily shown that in this example FAEE(E◦) is
equivalent to FEE,w˜(E◦) with w˜ = (µW (ε+ 1))
1
ε+1 .
Income is increasing in e but no longer a function of w. This implies that the
laziest (e = e) are poorest and the hard working (e = 1) are richest, regardless
their skill level (cfr. lemma 1).
The following corollary from proposition 1 states that the egalitarian equiv-
alent mechanism with the lower reference compensation characteristic Lorenz
dominates the egalitarian equivalent mechanism with the higher reference com-
pensation characteristic.
Corollary 1 : ∀E◦ ∈ D◦ : ∀w˜1, w˜2 ∈ [w, 1] : w˜1 < w˜2 ⇔ FEE,w˜1(E◦) ÂL FEE,w˜2(E◦).
4.1.3 The conditionally egalitarian mechanism
For all E◦ ∈ D◦, each individual k receives under a conditionally egalitarian
mechanism FCE,e˜(E◦) an income:








εµW (ε+ 1) (10)
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where e˜ denotes the reference preference characteristic.
We assume that e˜ is chosen between [e, 1]. In order to avoid the delicate choice
of e˜, Fleurbaey (1995a) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) propose an average
version of the conditionally egalitarian mechanism (FACE(E◦)). The idea is
to use every value of e ∈ [e, 1] successively as e˜ and to give each individual
the average of the resulting incomes she would obtain under these diﬀerent
FCE,e˜(E◦). However, it can be easily shown that in this example FACE(E◦) is
equivalent to FCE,e˜(E◦) with e˜ = (µE(ε))
1
ε .
Income is increasing in e. Since e˜ ≥ e, income is no longer increasing in w
for all individuals. More precisely, the poorest are laziest (e = e) and highest
skilled (w = 1), while the richest are hard working (e = 1) and highest skilled
(w = 1)(cfr. lemma 2). The slope of the iso-income curves under a condi-
tionally egalitarian mechanism (− ε(ε+1)w
eε−1
(eε−e˜ε) ) is larger than the slope of the
iso-income curves of the pre-tax income function (− ε(ε+1)
w
e ) and is positive for
all individuals i with ei < e˜. Figure 1 depicts iso-income curves for F
CE,e˜(E◦).
Figure 1: Iso-income curves for FCE,e˜(E)
Note that income will never be equally distributed. Graphically, all individu-
als would have to lie on the same iso-income curve. This requires correlation
between e and w, which violates our independence assumption.7
The following corollary from proposition 2 states that there is no Lorenz domi-
nance between two conditionally egalitarian mechanisms.
Corollary 2 : There does not exist E◦ ∈ D◦ and e˜1, e˜2 ∈ [e, 1] :
FCE,e˜1(E◦) ÂL FCE,e˜2(E◦).
7Remark that income is equally distributed when ei = e˜ for all i. However, this distribution
does not belong to Σ◦.
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4.2 Poverty dominance between two conditionally egali-
tarian mechanisms
Denote FCE,e˜(e,w) (E◦) the income that each individual with characteristics (e, w)
receives under FCE,e˜(E◦). As suggested at the end of subsection 3.3, the fact
that FCE,e˜1(e,1) (E◦) > FCE,e˜2(e,1) (E◦) suggests that we might arrive at a conclusion
in terms of poverty dominance between two diﬀerent conditionally egalitarian
mechanisms. The following proposition states that for all poverty lines below
eεµW (ε + 1), the conditionally egalitarian mechanism with the lower reference
preference characteristic first order poverty dominates the conditionally egali-
tarian mechanism with the higher reference preference characteristic.
Proposition 4 : ∀E◦ ∈ D◦ : ∀e˜1, e˜2 ∈ [e, 1] and e˜1 < e˜2 :
FCE,e˜1(E◦) ÂP1,eεµW (ε+1) FCE,e˜2(E◦).
Proof. First, note that for all e ∈ [e, e˜1], the technical rate of substitution
of FCE,e˜1(E◦) is higher than the technical rate of substitution of FCE,e˜2(E◦).
Therefore, iso-income curves cross at most once over the subspace [e, e˜1]× [w, 1].
Second, remark that all individuals with characteristics (e, (µW (ε + 1))
1
ε+1 )
receive an income y∗ = e
εµW (ε + 1), irrespective of which conditionally egali-
tarian mechanism is implemented. The iso-y∗ curve is depicted in figure 2 for
FCE,e˜1(E◦) and FCE,e˜2(E◦) with e < e˜1 < e˜2 < 1:
Figure 2: Iso-income curves for FCE,e˜1(E) and FCE,e˜2(E)
Third, it remains to show that two equal iso-income curves of two diﬀerent
conditionally egalitarian mechanisms only cross for income levels higher than
y∗. These crossings imply that assumptions about the marginal distributions
of w and e have to be made to establish first order poverty dominance for
income levels larger than y∗: we need to know exactly how many individuals
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are situated at each point in the e × w space. Denote wCE,e˜1y (e) as the skill
level that an individual with preference characteristic e should have to obtain
an income y under FCE,e˜1(E◦). Two equal iso-income curves of two diﬀerent
conditionally egalitarian mechanisms cross over the subspace [e, e˜1]×[w, 1] when
wCE,e˜2y (e) > w
CE,e˜1
y (e).
By (10), this is equivalent to

















Since (eε − e˜ε1) < 0 and (eε − e˜ε2) < 0, this inequality can be written as
(y − e˜ε2µW (ε+ 1)) (eε − e˜ε1) > (y − e˜ε1µW (ε+ 1)) (eε − e˜ε2)
⇔ (e˜ε2 − e˜ε1)y > (e˜ε2 − e˜ε1)eεµW (ε+ 1).
Since (e˜ε2 − e˜ε1) > 0, this requires
y > eεµW (ε+ 1) = y∗
which completes the proof.
Analogously, it can be shown that equal iso-income curves of two diﬀerent con-
ditionally egalitarian mechanisms no longer cross for all income levels higher
than the income of an individual with characteristics
³






Proposition 4 establishes first order poverty dominance results between two
conditionally egalitarian mechanisms. The maximum value of the poverty line
for which second order poverty dominance holds, is larger than eεµW (ε + 1).
To derive its exact value, additional assumptions about gE and gW are needed.
Since we do not want to make these assumptions here, we limited ourselves to
first order poverty dominance.
4.3 EE versus CE revisited
In this model, the remark of subsection 3.4 concerns the comparison of FEE,1(E◦)
and FCE,(µE(ε))
1
ε (E◦). Excluding this comparison, the following corollary from
proposition 3 states that a conditionally egalitarian mechanism cannot Lorenz
dominate an egalitarian equivalent mechanism.
Corollary 3 : There does not exist E◦ ∈ D◦, e˜ ∈ [e, 1] and w˜ ∈ [w, 1] :
FCE,e˜(E◦) ÂL FEE,w˜(E◦).
Finally, the remaining question is whether an egalitarian equivalent mecha-
nism can Lorenz dominate a conditionally egalitarian mechanism. A priori, one
could think that the former Lorenz dominates the latter, since the egalitarian
equivalent mechanism satisfies stronger compensation axioms and weaker re-
sponsibility axioms than the conditionally egalitarian mechanism. Therefore,
we examine first which egalitarian equivalent mechanisms can Lorenz dominate
all conditionally egalitarian mechanisms.
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Part a) of the following proposition states that if an egalitarian equivalent mech-
anism Lorenz dominates all conditionally egalitarian mechanisms, w˜ is smaller
than (µW (ε + 1))
1
ε+1 . Part b) states that if all egalitarian equivalent mecha-
nisms Lorenz dominate a conditionally egalitarian mechanism, the latter has a




a) ∀E◦ ∈ D◦ : ∀e˜ ∈ [e, 1] : FEE,w˜(E◦) ÂL FCE,e˜(E◦)⇒ w ≤ w˜ ≤ (µW (ε+1))
1
ε+1 ,
b) ∀E◦ ∈ D◦ : ∀w˜ ∈ [w, 1] : FEE,w˜(E◦) ÂL FCE,e˜(E◦)⇒ e˜ = (µE(ε))
1
ε .
Proof. Denote FEE,w˜(e,w) (E◦) the income that each individual with charac-
teristics (e, w) receives under FEE,w˜(E◦). The necessary condition for Lorenz
dominance that the poorest have at least the same income under FEE,w˜(E◦) as
under FCE,e˜(E◦), while the income of the richest should not be higher under
FEE,w˜(E◦) than under FCE,e˜(E◦) requires that: ∀e˜ :
FCE,e˜(e,1) (E◦) ≤ FEE,w˜(e,·) (E◦)
⇔ eε − e˜ε + e˜εµW (ε+ 1) ≤ eεw˜ε+1 − µE(ε)w˜ε+1 + µE(ε)µW (ε+ 1)





FCE,e˜(1,1) (E◦) ≥ FEE,w˜(1,·) (E◦)
⇔ 1− e˜ε + e˜εµW (ε+ 1) ≥ w˜ε+1 − µE(ε)w˜ε+1 + µE(ε)µW (ε+ 1)




Note that RHS(1) is increasing in e˜ since (µW (ε+1)−1)(eε−µE(ε))
> 0 while RHS(2) is
decreasing in e˜ since (µW (ε+1)−1)(1−µE(ε))
< 0. The shaded area of figure 3 depicts for
which values of w˜ and e˜, the corresponding FEE,w˜(E◦) and FCE,e˜(E◦) fulfill the
necessary condition. In part a) the dominance result has to hold for all values of
e˜. Consequently, only FEE,w˜(E◦) with w˜ ≤ (µW (ε+1))
1
ε+1 can Lorenz dominate
all FCE,e˜(E◦). In part b) the dominance result has to hold for all values of w˜.
Consequently, only FCE,e˜(E◦) with e˜ = (µE(ε))
1
ε can be Lorenz dominated by
all FEE,w˜(E◦).
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Figure 3: A necessary condition for LD
Proposition 5 identifies values for reference characteristics for which Lorenz dom-
inance results are possible. Whether Lorenz dominance results actually occur,
depends on the exact density functions gE and gW . The following numerical
example, whose set-up is described in appendix, illustrates:
a) that not all FEE,w˜(E◦) Lorenz dominate FCE,(µE(ε))
1
ε (E◦) when e and w are
uniformly distributed over the interval [0.1, 1],
b) the unique comparison where a conditionally egalitarian mechanism Lorenz
dominates an egalitarian equivalent mechanism and
c) that diﬀerent density functions lead to diﬀerent Lorenz dominance results
in the comparison of a conditionally egalitarian mechanism and an egalitarian
equivalent mechanism.
Numerical example: Denote Eγ ∈ D◦ the economy where f(e, w) is given by
(8), w is uniformly distributed over the interval [0.1, 1] and e is distributed over
the interval [0.1, 1] such that ∀e ∈ [0.1, 0.55] : gE(e) = γ0.45 and ∀e ∈ [0.55, 1] :
gE(e) =
1−γ
0.45 with γ ∈ (0, 1). When γ =
1
2 , e is uniformly distributed.
Consider E 1
2
. Suppose ε = 1. We test for Lorenz dominance of respectively
an egalitarian equivalent mechanism with w˜ = 0.5, w˜ = 0.7 and w˜ = 1 over a
conditionally egalitarian mechanism with e˜ = µE(1) = 0.55. The incomes of the





















for all y ∈ [−0.246, 0.653]. In the upper curve w˜ = 0.5, in the middle curve
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Figure 4: SEE,w˜;CE,0.55E 1
2
(y)
a) Figure 4 shows that FEE,0.5(E 1
2
) Lorenz dominates FCE,0.55(E 1
2
), but FEE,0.7(E 1
2
)
does not Lorenz dominate FCE,0.55(E 1
2
).
b) Recall the remark in subsection 3.4: the incomes of the poorest and the richest
are unchanged under FCE,0.55(E 1
2
) and FEE,1(E 1
2
). This is the unique combi-
nation of e˜ and w˜ for which the conditionally egalitarian mechanism can Lorenz
dominate the egalitarian equivalent mechanism. For E 1
2
, indeed FCE,0.55(E 1
2
)
Lorenz dominates FEE,1(E 1
2
).
c) For all Eγ with γ 6= 12 , FCE,0.55(Eγ) does not Lorenz dominate FEE,1(Eγ).
The incomes of the poorest and the richest are unchanged under FCE,µE(1)(Eγ)
and FEE,1(Eγ), implying that only for this specific comparison of mechanisms





2 γ. However, if γ 6= 12 , µE(1) 6= 0.55.
5 Conclusion
The implementation of a non-welfaristic redistribution mechanism not only re-
quires a normative judgement for the choice of reference responsibility or com-
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pensation characteristic. In order to trace out the implications of non-welfaristic
redistribution, also empirical information is needed. Only with accurate estima-
tions of the pre-tax income function and the distributions of responsibility and
compensation characteristics, the income distributions and levels of poverty of
diﬀerent non-welfaristic mechanisms can be thoroughly compared. If one lacks
such detailed information, but at least some agreement on the properties of the
pre-tax income function is reached, our analysis suggests that:
• Confronted with the choice of which egalitarian equivalent mechanism to
implement and depending on the economy concerned, a non-welfaristic
social planner concerned about income inequalities implements either an
egalitarian equivalent mechanism with a low (if the economy belongs to
D+) or with a high (if the economy belongs toD−) reference compensation
characteristic.
• Confronted with the choice of which conditionally egalitarian mechanism
to implement, none of the mechanisms can be ordered using the Lorenz
dominance criterion. If a non-welfaristic social planner has a particular
concern for the poorest in society a conditionally egalitarian mechanism
with a low reference preference characteristic is implemented.
• If a non-welfaristic social planner faces the full choice of which non-
welfaristic mechanism to implement, she should not believe that, since the
egalitarian equivalent mechanism satisfies stronger compensation axioms
and weaker responsibility axioms than the conditionally egalitarian mech-
anism, all egalitarian equivalent mechanisms Lorenz dominate all condi-
tionally egalitarian mechanisms. In our specific example only egalitar-
ian equivalent mechanisms with a suﬃciently low reference compensation
characteristic can Lorenz dominate all conditionally egalitarian mecha-
nisms. Conversely, only one conditionally egalitarian mechanism can be
Lorenz dominated by all egalitarian equivalent mechanisms. Whether such
Lorenz dominance results occur, depends on the distributions of respon-
sibility and compensation characteristics.
Appendix (set-up of the numerical example in section 4.3)
Take an arbitrary income level y ∈ [FCE,e˜(e,1) (E◦), FCE,e˜(1,1) (E◦)].
1) Using (9), GEE,w˜E◦ (y) equals the probability (Pr)




















2) Using (10), GCE,e˜E◦ (y) equals:
Pr(eεwε+1 − e˜εwε+1 + e˜εµW (ε+ 1) ≤ y).
Two cases arise, depending on whether e < e˜ or e > e˜.
When e < e˜, FCE,e˜(e,w) (E◦) < e˜εµW (ε+ 1) such that for y < e˜εµW (ε+ 1):

























ε } and e2(y) = (y − e˜εµW (ε+ 1) + e˜ε)
1
ε .




























If we suppose that ε = 1 and that e and w are uniformly distributed between
[e, 1] and [w, 1] respectively, then:
gE(e) =
1
1−e , gW (w) =
1
1−w , µE(1) =
1+e
2 and µW (2) =
(w2+w+1)
3 .








E◦ (x))dx becomes a function
of y, e, w, e˜ and w˜ and is simulated for e = 0.1, w = 0.1, e˜ = µE(1) = 0.55 and
w˜ = 0.5, 0.7 and 1 respectively.
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Is it fair to ‘make work pay’?∗
Roland Iwan Luttens† and Erwin Ooghe‡
Abstract
The design of the income transfer program for the lower incomes is a
hot issue in current public policy debate. Should we stick to a generous
welfare state with a sizeable basic income but high marginal tax rates
for the lower incomes and thus little incentives to work? Or should we
‘make work pay’ by subsidizing the work of low earners but possibly at the
cost of a smaller safety net? We think it is diﬃcult to answer this ques-
tion without making clear what individuals are (held) responsible for and
what not. First, we present a new fair allocation, coined a Pareto Eﬃcient
and Shared resources Equivalent allocation (PESE), which compensates
for diﬀerent productive skills but not for diﬀerent tastes for working. We
also characterize a fair social ordering which rationalizes the PESE al-
location. Second, we illustrate the optimal second-best allocation in a
discrete Stiglitz (1982, 1987) economy. The question whether we should
have subsidies for the low earners or not crucially depends on whether the
low-skilled have a strictly positive or zero skill. Third, we simulate fair
taxes for a sample of Belgian singles. Our simulation results suggest that
‘making work pay’ policies can be optimal, according to our fairness crite-
rion, but only in the unreasonable case in which none of the unemployed
are ever willing to work.
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1 Motivation
Focussing on the tax-benefit system as a whole, many European countries com-
bine a sizeable basic income with high marginal taxes for the low income earn-
ers. These programs are praised for their redistributional appeal, directing large
transfers towards the low incomes in society. But, at the same time, critics
have held these schemes responsible for large unemployment traps because they
do not provide incentives to (start) work(ing). Therefore some continental Eu-
ropean countries –such as Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy and the
Netherlands– have proposed and/or introduced tax credit schemes recently;
see Bernardi and Profeta (2004) for an overview. At the same time, the US and
the UK, with a much longer tradition in tax credit schemes, have reinforced the
role of their tax credits. The increased policy interest for such ‘making work
pay’ schemes, i.e., policies aiming at subsidizing the low income earners, is its
ability to tackle two problems at the same time. It has a positive eﬀect on em-
ployment (the number of people working and, to a lesser extent, the aggregate
labour hours), while it increases the income of poor households; see Pearson and
Scarpetta (2000) for an overview.
While ‘making work pay’ schemes may attain desirable objectives, it is not clear
whether it is also optimal to make work pay for a given budget constraint. The
‘welfarist’ optimal income tax literature consists of three canonical models, de-
pending on whether labour supply responses are modelled intensively and/or
extensively (Heckman, 1993). First, in a Mirrlees (1971) economy, individuals
respond via the intensive margin, i.e., by varying their labour hours or eﬀort.
Marginal taxes should be non-negative everywhere (Mirrlees, 1971), which ex-
cludes the possibility of subsidizing work. At the bottom, the marginal tax has
to be zero, but only in case everybody works (Seade, 1977). Once there exists
an atom of non-workers, the marginal tax rate has to be positive (Ebert, 1992)
and, according to some numerical simulations (Tuomala, 1990), rather high.
Using the empirical earnings distribution, (i) a U-shaped pattern of positive
marginal tax rates and (ii) high marginal tax rates at the bottom turn out to be
optimal in many cases (for (i) see Diamond, 1998, Saez, 2001 and Salanie´, 1998
and for (ii) see Piketty, 1997, Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2000 and Chone´ and
Laroque, 2005). Second, in Diamond’s (1980) approach, individuals respond
via the extensive margin, i.e., they choose to work or not. Marginal tax rates
can be negative, suggesting at least the possibility of subsidizing the work of
low earners. Third , Saez (2002) presents a unifying framework where individu-
als can respond via both margins. Support for one of the two income transfer
schemes depends on the relative importance of both response margins and on
the redistributive tastes of government. He proposes a sizeable basic income
(around $7300/year), but combined with a tax exemption at the bottom (for
gross incomes up to $5000/year).
In the same year of Mirrlees’ (1971) seminal contribution, Rawls (1971) crit-
icizes the welfarist approach, in which only utility information is allowed to
judge the desirability of diﬀerent social states. Rawls (1982) presents the fol-
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lowing example of expensive preferences. Otherwise identical individuals diﬀer
in their preferences towards food: some are happy with a simple meal, some
only with an expensive dinner. Rawls asks the question whether we really want
to distribute resources in such a way that those with expensive tastes get more
resources than others. If we do not like such a distribution, we have to use an
argument to decide which tastes are expensive. Such an argument has to be
based on non-utility information. Hence, it implies a rejection of the welfarist
approach. In the aftermath of Rawls’ influential work, many alternative theories
of distributive justice were proposed. Although very diverse in equalisandum,
they almost all have Dworkin’s (1981) cut in common. Dworkin claims that
not all individual characteristics can (should) be considered as morally arbi-
trary. Therefore one has to make a clear cut between endowments (e.g., skills,
talents, handicaps, etc.) and ambitions (e.g., preferences, eﬀort, tastes, etc.).
He introduces personal responsibility: individuals are responsible for their am-
bitions –as long as they identify with them– but not for their endowments.
As a consequence, a fair distribution scheme should be ambition-sensitive, but
endowment-insensitive.
In an optimal income tax setting, fairness could require to compensate for diﬀer-
ences in productive skill (endowment) but not for diﬀerences in taste for working
(ambition).1 Schokkaert et al. (2004) introduce such fairness considerations in
diﬀerent ways and calculate the corresponding optimal linear income tax, which
turns out to be positive. Allowing for non-linear tax schemes, results change
drastically. Boadway et al. (2002) analyze the optimal non-linear income tax
according to a weighted utilitarian or maximin social planner where diﬀerent
weights are chosen for diﬀerent tastes. Negative marginal taxes (for the low in-
come earners) are optimal in case suﬃcient weight is given to the hard-working
individuals. Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2005a,b) characterize fair social orderings
to analyze non-linear income taxes. In both theoretical studies, it is optimal
to direct the largest subsidies to the hard-working poor (the agents having the
lowest skill and choosing the largest labour time), as long as the lowest skill is
strictly positive.
In the next section we present a new fair allocation, coined a Pareto Eﬃcient
and Shared resources Equivalent (PESE) allocation. As the name suggests, the
optimal allocation is Pareto eﬃcient and all individuals are indiﬀerent between
their bundle and what they would get if it were physically possible to divide
or share all resources, including the productive skills. Section 3 characterizes
the shared resources social ordering which rationalizes the PESE allocation. In
section 4, we introduce a ‘discrete’ Stiglitz (1982, 1987) economy with (i) four
types of individuals (defined by a low or high productive skill and a low or
high taste for working) and (ii) a government who wants to install fair taxes,
but cannot observe individuals’ type. We show that on the basis of the shared
resources social ordering it is recommended to subsidize the low earners as long
as the low-skilled individuals have a strictly positive skill. In case the low-skilled
1Roemer et al. (2001) consider the education level of the parents as the compensating
variable.
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have a zero skill subsidies can never be optimal. These theoretical results are in
line with those found in Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2005a,b). In section 5, we en-
hance realism by simulating fair taxes for Belgian singles, while carefully paying
attention to the calibration of the compensation (hourly wages) and responsibil-
ity (taste for working) variable. Similar to the welfarist simulation results often
found in Mirrlees economies, our shared resources social ordering also suggests
to install a U-shaped pattern of positive marginal tax rates in almost all cases.
Negative marginal tax rates, and thus ‘making work pay’ policies, can only be
optimal in the unreasonable case in which all the unemployed are never willing
to work.
2 Equality of resources revisited
When all resources in society are alienable and divisible, Dworkin proposes
to divide resources equally (endowment insensitivity), followed by an auction
to reallocate resources according to taste (ambition sensitivity). This leads to a
Pareto eﬃcient and envy-free allocation. To study fair income taxation, however,
we have to introduce productive resources (skills) which are not alienable and
therefore a problem arises. In production economies Pareto eﬃcient and envy-
free allocations do not exist in general.
A first class of solutions tries to extend the above Dworkinian auction by as-
signing property rights over leisure. Varian (1974) analyzes two, rather extreme,
solutions. One may divide consumption goods equally and either (i) assign each
individual his own leisure, or (ii) give each individual an equal share in each of
the agents’ (including his own) leisure time. After trade the resulting competi-
tive (and hence Pareto eﬃcient) equilibria are called respectively (i) wealth-fair
and (ii) income-fair. In the wealth-fair allocation productive talents are a pri-
vate good and the resulting allocation does not compensate at all for inabilities.
In the income-fair allocation productive talents are a common good. The high-
skilled has to buy back his expensive leisure and is therefore punished for being
a high skill type, resulting in a slavery of the talented. Intermediate solutions
exist where skills are neither purely private, nor purely common (Fleurbaey and
Maniquet, 1996, Kolm, 1996, Maniquet, 1998).
A second class of solutions starts from the concept of fair-equivalence. Pazner
and Schmeidler (1978) define an allocation to be fair-equivalent if everyone
is indiﬀerent between his bundle in this allocation and the bundle he would
receive in a ‘hypothetical’ fair, i.e., envy-free, allocation. It then suﬃces to
define an interesting ‘hypothetical’ fair allocation and to look whether there
exist Pareto eﬃcient ones among all fair-equivalent allocations. The resulting
allocation is called a Pareto eﬃcient and fair-equivalent (PEFE) allocation.
Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) propose an egalitarian allocation –an allocation
where everybody consumes the same consumption-leisure bundle– as the fair
one. We propose a diﬀerent fair allocation which we coin a ‘shared resources’
allocation. This is the allocation which would result if it were (physically)
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possible to divide or share all resources, including the productive ones. To make
this idea more precise, we introduce some notation.
A fixed number of individuals, denoted i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n}, diﬀer in skills and
preferences. Skill s ∈ R+ defines production (called gross income in the sequel)
in a linear way, or y = s` with ` ∈ [0, 1] the amount of labour. We denote a
skill profile by s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Rn+. Taste for working is represented by a
continuously diﬀerentiable utility function
U : R× [0, 1]→ R : (c, `) 7→ U (c, `) ,
which is strictly increasing (resp. strictly decreasing) in consumption c (resp. labour
`) and strictly quasi-concave. We call U the corresponding set of utility func-
tions and, normalizing the consumption price to one, we refer to c as the net
income in the sequel. A utility profile is denoted by U = (U1, . . . , Un) ∈ Un.
An economy e = (s,U) is completely defined by a skill and a utility profile; all
economies are gathered in a set E = Rn+ × Un.
Individuals are (held) responsible for their tastes, but not for their skills. There-
fore, we want to compensate individuals for diﬀerent outcomes which are only
due to diﬀerent skills but not for diﬀerent outcomes which are only caused by
diﬀerent tastes for working. In case skills are alienable –think, e.g., of individ-
uals as farmers who receive, as a matter of brute bad luck, either a blunt or a
whetted scythe (the skill s) to harvest crops (the consumption c)– there is a
particularly simple and attractive way to obtain a fair allocation:
(a) each individual pays (or receives) the same lump-sum amount of money,
(b) each individual can use each skill (including his own) for a time equal to 1n
at most.
Individuals are assumed to be rational: given (b), the budget set which maxi-
mizes net incomes (for all possible labour choices) starts using the highest skill
for the first 1n time units, followed by the second highest skill for an additional
1
n time units, and so on. In the sequel, we call this budget set the ‘shared re-
sources’ budget set and the resulting allocation (which ultimately depends on
the tastes in society) is called the ‘shared resources’ allocation.
However, sharing productive resources is not technically feasible in many cases.
Labour market productivities, due to inborn characteristics such as intelligence,
talents, handicaps and so on, are typically inalienable. Still, we could consider
the allocation which would arise if it were possible to divide and share all re-
sources equally as an interesting ‘hypothetical’ case. However, the resulting
hypothetical ‘shared resources’ allocation is not necessarily Pareto eﬃcient in
the actual economy. Therefore, we propose to focus on Pareto Eﬃcient and
Shared resources Equivalent (PESE) allocations. We first define our well-being
concept, which is closely linked to the PESE allocation. Let Z = (R× [0, 1])n
be the set of allocations z = (zi)i∈N , containing one bundle zi = (ci, `i) for each
individual i in N .
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well-being: For each allocation z ∈ Z, the vector of well-being levels w =
(wi)i∈N ∈ Rn is defined by the amounts of money wi which would make individ-
ual i indiﬀerent between (i) receiving (or paying) this amount of money wi and
sharing all productive resources equally (in time), and (ii) his actual bundle zi.
Because the well-being vector w depends on the allocation z and the economy
e = (s,U), we write w =W (z, e), with wi =Wi (z, e).
We now define a PESE allocation.
pese allocation: An allocation z ∈ Z is a PESE allocation if and only if z is
(i) Pareto eﬃcient and (ii) all individuals have the same well-being.
To illustrate these concepts, suppose (i) there are only two skill types possible
in society, say low (L) and high (H), which are equally represented in the skill
pool s, and (ii) there are only two tastes for working possible, also called low
(L) and high (H). An allocation z = (zLL, zLH , zHL, zHH) contains one bundle
zst = (cst, `st) for each of the four types st, with s referring to the skill (low
or high) and t referring to the taste (low or high). Figure 1 illustrates the
budget sets and (resulting) allocations in case (a) each individual receives the
same lump-sum amount of money a, but productive resources are not shared,
and (a)+(b) each individual receives the same lump-sum amount a and also the



































Figure 1: Allocation change when sharing productive resources.
Figure 2 illustrates a PESE allocation for an economy defined by the same
assumptions (i) and (ii) as in figure 1. The well-being levels are the same for
all individuals and equal to a0. Notice that figure 2 is constructed for the sake
of clarity in such a way that the allocation is not necessarily feasible. It should
be clear, however, that given the skill and preference technology, bundles and
2Although fairness is the only thing that matters for a hypothetical allocation, notice that
our ‘shared resources’ allocation is neither eﬃcient in the hypothetical economy. In figure 1,
case (a)+(b), individuals with types LL and HL have some time left to use the highest skill,
while type LH and HH individuals would love to use it, and so there is room for Pareto
improvements in the hypothetical economy. Therefore another plausible fair allocation –
but more diﬃcult to compute– would be obtained if we allow for trading time slots in the
hypothetical economy.
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indiﬀerence curves could all be translated downwards so that the allocation

























Figure 2: A Pareto eﬃcient and shared resources equivalent allocation.
Two observations need to be stressed. First, an allocation which gives an indi-
vidual a higher utility (puts him on a higher indiﬀerence curve) also increases
his well-being level. As such, our definition of well-being corresponds with one
specific, but, according to us, interesting cardinalization of preferences. Second,
well-being has to be interpreted as a ‘relative’ measure of fair treatment in the
spirit of the PESE allocation. If two individuals had the same well-being, they
would have been treated fairly because both individuals would have been indif-
ferent between their actual bundle and the bundle they would choose if (a) they
received the same lump-sum amount of money and (b) all productive resources
were shared equally. If one individual had a strictly lower well-being compared
to another, he would have been treated unfairly with respect to the other be-
cause both individuals would have been indiﬀerent between their actual bundle
and the bundle they would choose if (b) all productive resources were shared
equally but (a) the former individual received a strictly lower lump-sum amount
of money.
3 A ‘shared resources’ social ordering
In case it is possible to recognize the less from the more productive and the lazy
from the hard-working individuals, we can choose among all Pareto eﬃcient
and ‘shared resources’ equivalent allocations described in the previous section.
However, it is not always possible to observe types. To proceed in such a
second-best setting, it is more convenient to characterize a corresponding ‘shared
resources’ social ordering.
A rule f maps economies into orderings, or f : E → R : e 7→ Re = f (e), with R
the set of all orderings (complete and transitive binary relations) defined over
allocations z in Z; call Pe and Ie the corresponding asymmetric and symmetric
relation. We define some properties for f .
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Our Pareto principle is equal to Pareto Indiﬀerence and the Weak Pareto prin-
ciple together, i.e., if everyone is indiﬀerent between allocations z and z0, then
z should also be socially indiﬀerent to z0 and if everyone strictly prefers alloca-
tion z to z0, then z should also be socially strictly preferred to z0. Anonymity
requires that the names of the individuals do not matter. Formally:
Pareto: For each economy e ∈ E and for all allocations z, z0 ∈ Z: If Ui (zi) =
Ui (z
0
i) for all i ∈ N , then zIez0. If, Ui (zi) > Ui (z0i) for all i ∈ N , then zPez0.
Anonymity: For each economy e ∈ E , for each allocation z ∈ Z and for each
permutation π : N → N over individuals: If Ui = Uj for all i, j ∈ N , then
zIeπ (z), with π (z) =
¡
zπ(1), . . . , zπ(n)
¢
.
In line with the idea to compensate for diﬀerences in outcomes which are only
due to diﬀerences in skills, compensation (Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2005a) re-
quires that a Pigou-Dalton transfer (in terms of net income) from a rich to
a poor individual with the same preferences and the same labour should be
socially approved:
Compensation: For each economy e ∈ E , for all allocations z, z0 ∈ Z and for
all individuals i, j ∈ N : If (i) `i = `j = `0i = `0j and Ui = Uj , (ii) ∃δ > 0 such
that ci = c
0
i + δ < c
0
j − δ = cj and (iii) zk = z0k for all k 6= i, j, then zRez0.
Finally, in line with (i) our well-being definition and (ii) the idea that individuals
are responsible for their tastes, Utility Independence requires the ranking of two
allocations to be the same (i) whenever they give rise to the same well-being
vector, (ii) irrespective of the utility profile:





for all allocations z, z0 ∈ Z: If W (z, e) =W (z, e0) andW (z0, e) =W (z0, e0),
then zRez
0 ⇔ zRe0z0.
Given these axioms, we should focus on the minimal well-being in society, or:3
Theorem: If a rule f : E → R satisfies Pareto, Anonymity, Compensation
and Utility Independence, then, for each economy e ∈ E and for all allocations
z, z0 ∈ Z: minW (z, e) > minW (z0, e) implies zPez0.
First, possible candidates are the maximin and the leximin rule applied to well-
beings, but in the sequel we do not bother about ranking allocations with equal
minimal well-being levels, basically because the above definition is suﬃcient
for optimization purposes. Second, the ‘shared resources’ social ordering has
some formal similarity with Fleurbaey and Maniquet’s (2005c) s˜-implicit budget
leximin function, where s˜ is a reference skill level. In our case, the reference skill
s˜ is piece-wise linear and endogenously defined by the skill pool in society. As
such, laisser-faire allocations are selected in case all individuals have the same
skill. Third, some readers might find the chosen inequality aversion too extreme.
3See appendix A for a proof.
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However, the only redistributive condition is Compensation which in this weak
form is compatible with any degree of inequality aversion, including zero. It is
the combination of these axioms that entails an infinite aversion to inequality;
see Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2005a) for a similar result.
4 Fair taxes: theory
In the previous section, we characterize a fair social ordering inspired by the
PESE allocation. In this section, we analyze what happens when the govern-
ment uses this fair social ordering to calculate optimal taxes in a discrete Stiglitz
economy (1982, 1987) with four types which are not observable to the govern-
ment.
All individuals in N = {1, . . . , n} can have four types, denoted (s, t) ∈ S × T ,
where s is the skill level and t the taste for working; we abbreviate types as st ∈
ST . Each type st is represented by nst > 0 individuals, with n =
P
st∈ST nst.
Skills can be low or high, or s ∈ S = {L,H}, with 0 < L < H; later on, we
come back to the issue of zero skills. Tastes for working can also be low or high,
or t ∈ {L,H}, which correspond with a utility function Ut.4
As before, utility functions belong to U , but we impose some additional prop-
erties. Let Vst represent the preferences in the consumption-income space for





impose two additional properties on the utility functions Ut; see Stiglitz (1982,
1987) for the first and Boadway et al. (2002) for the second property:
Single-crossingness: A higher taste for working t corresponds with a lower
marginal rate of substitution (denoted MRSt = −∂Ut/∂`∂Ut/∂c ), expressing the view
that individuals with a higher taste for working require less compensation (in
terms of net income c) to work a little bit longer. Formally: MRSL > MRSH
in R× [0, 1].
Indistinguishable middle type: The types LH and HL have the same pref-
erences in the consumption-income space. Formally, there exists a continuous
and strictly increasing function φ : R→ R, such that VLH = φ◦VHL in R×[0, L].
Both assumptions together, the marginal rates of substitution in consumption-
income space (denoted MRSYst = −∂Vst/∂y∂Vst/∂c ) are also single-crossing, more
precisely:
MRSYLL > MRSYLH =MRSYHL > MRSYHH , in R× [0, L] and
MRSYHL > MRSYHH in R× [L,H].
We focus in the sequel on allocations x = (xLL, xLH , xHL, xHH) in consumption-
income space, thus x ∈ X = (R× [0, L])2× (R× [0,H])2, containing one bundle
4The exact scalars do not matter here, so we stick to the notation of L to denote low taste
for working and/or low-skilled andH > L to denote high taste for working and/or high-skilled.
5Whenever s = 0, we define Vst (c, y) = c for all (c, y) ∈ R× {0}.
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xst = (cst, yst) for each type st ∈ ST . The program of the government is to find
the best allocation(s) x –‘best’ according to the fair social ordering defined
in section 3– subject to (i) incentive compatibility constraints (no type envies
another type’s bundle) and (ii) a feasibility constraint (the sum of all taxes is
larger than the government requirement g ∈ R). With a slight abuse of notation,





(Wst (x))st∈ST subject to (∗)
incentive compatibility constraints ICst,(st)0 :




,∀st ∈ {H} × T,∀ (st)0 ∈ ST,




,∀st ∈ {L} × T,∀ (st)0 ∈ ST with y(st)0 ≤ L.
feasibility constraint: X
st∈ST
nst (yst − cst) ≥ g.
Our first result tells us that the lowest income type, the ‘undeserving poor’ with
type LL, must always receive lower subsidies (or pay higher taxes) than the
second lowest income type, the ‘hard-working poor’ with type LH.6 This result
suggests that it is optimal –according to our fair social ordering– to ‘make
work pay’ by subsidizing the low earners; this result is in line with Fleurbaey
and Maniquet (2005a,b).
Proposition 1 : Consider a four type economy with skills 0 < L < H and tastes
represented by utility functions UL, UH ∈ U , which satisfy single-crossingness
and indistinguishable middle type. Consider a government who optimizes the
program defined by ( ∗). In an optimal allocation x∗ ∈ X we must have y∗LL −
c∗LL ≥ y∗LH − c∗LH .
We have to put this result in perspective, however. Although it is reasonable
to assume that all individuals (with a capacity for work) have strictly posi-
tive productive skills, individuals might be constrained in their choice due to
labour market frictions. Minimum wage laws, rationing and so on may prevent
individuals, in particular the low-skilled, from working. Suppose, in our four
type economy, that the low-skilled individuals are willing but cannot work due
to such constraints which are beyond their responsibility. In such a case, their
skills are nullified and, as shown in appendix B, the LH-type individuals always
have the lowest level of well-being. Because these individuals will never work,
maximizing the minimal well-being boils down to maximizing the basic income
6All proofs can be found in appendix B.
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in society; see Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2005a,b) for a similar result. This turns
proposition 1 round, or, the LL- and LH-type individuals (with y∗LL = y
∗
LH = 0)
must always receive higher subsidies (or pay lower taxes) than the second lowest
income type (here the HL-type individuals).
Proposition 2 : Consider a four type economy with skills L = 0 < H and tastes
represented by utility functions UL, UH ∈ U , which satisfy single-crossingness
and indistinguishable middle type. Consider a government who optimizes the
program defined by ( ∗). In an optimal allocation x∗ ∈ X we must have y∗LL −
c∗LL = y
∗
LH − c∗LH ≤ y∗HL − c∗HL.
Both proposition 1 and 2 are based on simple fictitious economies. Furthermore,
in proposition 2 we consider a rather extreme case in which all unemployed
(the low-skilled) are not able to work. In the next section we simulate fair
taxes for a sample of Belgian singles. It allows us to focus on (i) more realistic
economies with many diﬀerent types and, more importantly, on (ii) diﬀerent
and more realistic scenarios concerning the ability of the unemployed to work.
The diﬀerent scenarios in (ii) have a crucial impact on the tax-benefit scheme
for the low earners.
5 Fair taxes: simulation results
5.1 Calibration
We use a sample of singles from the 1997 wave of the Panel Study for Bel-
gian Households.7 We only include singles with a capacity for work (students,
pensioners, sick, or handicapped singles are excluded). We observe (i) the pre-
tax yearly labour income y, (ii) the amount of labour `, normalized such that
0 ≤ ` ≤ 1, where ` = 1 corresponds with 2925 hours, i.e., 45 weeks times 65
hours, (iii) the gross hourly wage rate σ (only observed for those who worked,
i.e., both y, ` 6= 0) which leads to a gross yearly wage rate s = 2925σ and (iv)
the total net unemployment benefit β (only observed for those who were partly
or completely unemployed in 1997) from which we derive the net yearly unem-
ployment benefit b = β1−` , i.e., the net unemployment benefit one would obtain
if full-time unemployed (` = 0).
First, we consider all individuals for which we possess all of the above infor-
mation. We consider quasi-linear preferences (which excludes income eﬀects)
represented by utility functions:8







7Mortelmans, D., Casman, M.-T. (2002) PSBH. Panel Study on Belgian Households (1992-
2002) Universiteit Antwerpen, Universite´ de Lie`ge.
8Due to quasi-linearity, other non-labour income (e.g., due to rents, gifts, alimony, child
allowances) does not matter for the labour choice of an individual. Furthermore, we keep
individuals responsible for the other non-labour income and it is therefore excluded from our
analysis.
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with t the taste parameter (possibly diﬀerent for diﬀerent individuals) and
ε the labour supply elasticity (the same for all individuals). Preferences in
consumption-income space become:









The net income of a Belgian single equals y − τ97(y) + b(1 − ys ), with τ97(·)
the actual tax system for singles in Belgium in 1997 (reported in appendix C)
and b(1 − ys ) the benefit when working ` =
y
s units of time. Both tax and
benefit parts separately, as well as the resulting budget set (the solid line), are




































Figure 3: Calibration of the taste parameter t.
We calibrate t such that the choice of y is rationalized for each single. More
precisely, the slope of the individual’s budget set at y, denoted h (y), should
be equal to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and gross















Second, since we could only observe gross yearly wages s (resp. net yearly unem-
ployment benefits b) for individuals who worked in 1997 (resp. individuals who
received unemployment benefits in 1997), we complete our dataset by imputing
values for s and b, whenever unobserved, via a Heckman selection model. Thus,
in estimating s and b, we correct for a possible sample selection bias due to the
fact that we only observe wages s for those who worked and benefits b for those
who were (permanently or temporarily) unemployed. The variables used for the
imputation as well as the estimation results are described in appendix D.
9In order to have preferences that are strictly decreasing in labour, t must be strictly
positive. Therefore, we drop all individuals with h(y) ≤ 0 out of the sample (17 observations).
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We end up with a heterogeneous sample of 621 singles who diﬀer in skills s and
tastes t, which drive their labour market behaviour; appendix E contains some
descriptive statistics for our dataset. Three points are worth mentioning. First,
propositions 1 and 2 from section 4 are not directly applicable in this section.
The reason being that, unlike in the four type economy, we no longer observe
individuals for every combination of s and t. In other words, the theoretical
No Identification assumption of Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2005b) is not fulfilled
in our sample. Second, the non-responsibility parameter s and the responsibil-
ity parameter t in our dataset are barely correlated: using a low labour supply
elasticity ε = 0.1 for singles, the correlation between s and t equals −0.071, sug-
gesting independently distributed skills and tastes. With a strong correlation,
compensating for skills only (and not for tastes) would be a dubious exercise.
Third, given the nature of our quasi-linear preferences, all unemployed receive
a taste for working t = 0. To put it diﬀerently, all unemployed are considered
unwilling to work. We relax this crucial assumption later on.
5.2 Results
Rather than using allocations as in the government program (∗), we use a piece-
wise linear tax-benefit scheme as our instrument to approximate a non-linear
tax scheme. As we are mainly concerned with the bottom incomes, we consider
a piecewise linear tax-benefit scheme up to yearly gross earnings of 20000 in
steps of 500 and we use a constant marginal tax rate afterwards. Using either
a wider range of piecewise linear taxes (up to 80000 in steps of 500) or a finer
grid (up to 20000 in steps of 250) does not change our results for the bottom
incomes drastically. Remarkably, using a wider range leads to approximately
constant marginal tax rates for incomes above 20000 which, except for the very
high incomes, approximate 11+ε , the optimal linear tax rate when maximizing
basic income (see Atkinson, 1995). Given such a tax-benefit scheme, individuals
choose their best bundle (according to their tastes and skills) and, therefore,
incentive constraints are automatically satisfied. For the feasibility constraint,
we use the total government requirement (g) in the actual system, which is (in
per capita terms) equal to 3851. Finally, to obtain realistic proposals, we
add participation constraints to the government program (∗), such that no one
prefers the bundle (0, 0) to the allocated bundle in the optimum.
5.2.1 Three simulations
In this subsection we report and discuss simulation results for three cases; a
sensitivity analysis with respect to the main parameters is postponed to the
next subsection.
No income eﬀects and a low labour supply elasticity do not seem unrealistic
for singles; see, e.g., Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for an empirical assessment.
Using a labour supply elasticity ε = 0.1, figure 4 depicts the chosen bundles in
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the consumption-gross income space for the following cases.10
First, we present the Rawlsian optimal allocation (denoted RAWLS in figure 4),
i.e., the one which maximizes the basic income, as a benchmark case. It installs
a high basic income equal to 9363 and high (and almost constant) positive
marginal tax rates for the bottom incomes.
Second, we show the optimal allocation according to our fair social ordering in
the extreme case that all unemployed are never willing to work (denoted 100%
in figure 4). This gives a low (yearly) basic income equal to 518, moderate
subsidies fading in around 3000 and fading out around 10500, followed by
progressive taxes. Thus, it seems fair to ‘make work pay’, even if it brings about
a very low basic income.
Third, the 100%-case is clearly an extreme viewpoint. For example, minimum
wage laws in Belgium could keep some individuals (especially those with low
skills s) from working and, therefore, our calibration might underestimate their
true taste parameter t, thus overestimating their well-being level w. More rea-
sonably, at least some of the observed unemployment must be involuntary, es-
pecially in the case of singles. Suppose unemployment is voluntary for p% of
the unemployed: their taste levels remain equal to zero. The other (1− p)%
are constrained, i.e., although they would like to work, they are and will always
remain constrained at y = 0, but we want to use their ‘true’ taste parameter to
calculate well-being levels. Taste levels are unfortunately unknown (and diﬃcult
to infer from our data), therefore we make the following assumption: we assign
all the constrained unemployed the same taste level in a way to be explained
later on. Although simplifying, giving them the same taste level allows us to
disregard the exact value of p, as long as it diﬀers from 100%. The reason is
that all the constrained unemployed end up with the same well-being and our
maximin-type criterion is not sensitive to population size. Thus, for example,
only one (or all but one) constrained unemployed would lead to the same result.
For the moment, we suppose that their tastes equal the average taste of those
currently working. Although one might be inclined to choose a lower taste level
for the constrained unemployed, we refer to the fact that skills and tastes in our
dataset are approximately uncorrelated. The optimal allocation for this case is
denoted <100% in figure 4.11 We get a sizeable basic income of 6318, illustrat-
ing that the constrained unemployed are in the <100% case among the worst-oﬀ
in terms of well-being. In addition, it displays a U-shaped pattern of positive
marginal tax rates: high marginal taxes for the bottom incomes, followed by
an almost neutral region (for incomes between 4000- 10500) and again high
marginal taxes afterwards.
10Notice that dotted lines do not represent an optimal tax-benefit schedule, but are only
connecting the chosen consumption-gross income bundles.
11For reasons of calculation, we choose p equal to 90% and assign the average taste level to












Figure 4: Optimal allocation for the Rawlsian case, the 100%- and <100%-case.
Table 1 summarizes for all three cases (in columns) and for diﬀerent gross income
groups G (in rows) (i) the proportion of individuals |G|n and (ii) the average
tax rate ( 1|G|
P
i∈G (yi − ci)). Average tax rates are monotonically increasing
in gross income, except in the 100%-case, which is in line with our previous
observation that ‘making work pay’ can only be optimal in the unreasonable
case where none of the unemployed is ever willing to work.
RAWLS 100% <100%
income group prop. avg. tax prop. avg. tax prop. avg. tax
0 0.21 −9363 0.19 −518 0.19 −6318
0 < y ≤ 5000 0.07 −5595 0.05 −98 0.05 −4294
5000 < y ≤ 10000 0.06 −2679 0.06 −2222 0.05 −1610
10000 < y ≤ 15000 0.14 3370 0.17 −2424 0.18 −615
15000 < y ≤ 20000 0.26 7205 0.23 2785 0.24 4972
20000 < y 0.26 15856 0.30 13104 0.29 14714
Table 1: Some characteristics for the Rawlsian case, the 100%- and <100%-case.
5.2.2 Sensitivity analysis
As we believe that no one would be willing to defend the 100%-case, we focus
on the <100%-case for our sensitivity analysis. We investigate the impact of (i)
the labour supply elasticity and (ii) the taste level assigned to the constrained
unemployed.
First, the labour supply elasticity ε equaled 0.1 in our previous simulations. Fig-
ure 5 shows the impact of halving and doubling ε on our optimal allocation, here
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denoting the <100%-case of figure 4 by ‘eps=0.1’. Changing ε has a moderate
impact on marginal tax rates but the U-shaped pattern of marginal tax rates re-
mains intact; see Saez (2001) for similar results in welfarist Mirrlees economies.
As expected, choosing a higher labour supply elasticity leads to lower marginal
tax rates everywhere and, for a given budget constraint, it installs a (substan-
tially) lower basic income. For low values of ε, marginal tax rates are everywhere
positive, excluding ‘making work pay’-type policies. Choosing a higher value of
ε introduces subsidies for gross income earners between 6000 and 10000,












Figure 5: Measuring the impact of varying ε.
Second, the taste level assigned to the constrained unemployed equaled the
average taste of the working class in the previous section. Here we consider
two additional cases: half of the average taste of those currently working (de-
noted HALF in figure 6) and the double of the average taste (denoted DOU-
BLE in figure 6). These variants have a clear interpretation. The HALF-case
(resp. DOUBLE-case) corresponds with the assumption that each constrained
unemployed needs two times more (resp. half of the) additional consumption for
a unit of additional labour compared to the ‘average’ worker. Figure 6 presents













Figure 6: Measuring the impact of varying tastes.
Choosing less or more conservative estimates for the tastes of the constrained
unemployed plays a moderate role. As expected, the higher their taste for work-
ing, the lower their well-being, which puts upward pressure on the optimal basic
income. Furthermore, halving or doubling the assigned taste level does not alter
the U-shaped pattern of positive marginal tax rates.
6 Conclusion
Given the increased importance many governments attach to ‘making work pay’
policies, we examine whether subsidizing low earners is optimal according to a
specific ‘fair’ social ordering. Fairness considerations are kept simple in this
paper: we want to compensate individuals for diﬀerences in productive skills,
but we keep them responsible for their tastes for working.
We consider a discrete Stiglitz (1982, 1987) economy with four types, defined
by a low or high productive skill and a low or high taste for working, and
a government that wants to install fair taxes but cannot observe individuals’
type. We show that fairness recommends to subsidize the low earners as long as
the low-skilled individuals have a strictly positive skill. In case the low-skilled
have a zero skill, subsidies can never be optimal.
To enhance realism, we simulate fair taxes for a sample of Belgian singles. Our
fairness criterion suggests a U-shaped pattern of positive marginal tax rates in
almost all cases. This strongly suggests that negative marginal tax rates, and
thus ‘making work pay’ policies, cannot be optimal in the reasonable case in
which at least some unemployed are willing to work but cannot due to exogenous
labour market constraints.
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Appendix A: The ‘shared resources’ social order-
ing: proof
If a rule f : E → R satisfies Pareto, Anonymity, Compensation and Utility
Independence, then, for each economy e ∈ E and for all allocations z, z0 ∈ Z:
minW (z, e) > minW (z0, e) implies zPez0.
Proof.
First, we show in three steps that Pareto Indiﬀerence (the first part of the Pareto
axiom) and Utility Independence for f are equivalent with Neutrality for f :
Neutrality: For all economies e = (s,U), e0 = (s,U0) ∈ E and for all allo-
cations a,b, c,d ∈ Z: If W (a, e) = W (b, e0) and W (c, e) = W (d, e0), then
aRec⇔ bRe0d.
1. If f satisfies Neutrality then f also satisfies Pareto Indiﬀerence. Suppose
the antecedent of Pareto Indiﬀerence is true for a certain economy e ∈ E and
two allocations z, z0 ∈ Z, i.e., Ui (zi) = Ui (z0i) for all i ∈ N . As such, zi lies
on the same indiﬀerence curve as z0i for all individuals and, by definition of
our well-being concept, W (z, e) =W (z0, e). Let e0 = e and define allocations
a = d = z and b = c = z0. As a consequence, W (a, e) = W (b, e0) and
W (c, e) =W (d, e0) are true by construction. Using Neutrality, we get aRec⇔
bRe0d, or equivalently, zRez
0 ⇔ z0Rez (•). Because of completeness of Re, we
must have either zRez
0 (and also z0Rez via (•)) or z0Rez (and also zRez0 via
(•)). Both cases lead to zIez0 establishing Pareto Indiﬀerence.
2. If f satisfies Neutrality then f also satisfies Utility Independence. Suppose
the antecedent of Utility Independence is true, i.e., there exist two economies
e = (s,U) ,e0 = (s,U0) ∈ E and two allocations z, z0 ∈ Z such that W (z, e) =
W (z, e0) andW (z0, e) =W (z0, e0). Simply choose a = b = z and c = d = z0
such thatW (a, e) =W (b, e0) andW (c, e) =W (d, e0) holds. Using Neutrality,
we get aRec ⇔ bRe0d, or equivalently, zRez0 ⇔ zRe0z0 establishing Utility
Independence.
3. If f satisfies Pareto Indiﬀerence and Utility Independence then f also satisfies
Neutrality. Suppose the antecedent of Neutrality holds, i.e., there exist two
economies e = (s,U) and e0 = (s,U0) ∈ E and four allocations a,b, c,d ∈ Z
such that W (a, e) = W (b, e0) and W (c, e) = W (d, e0). Let us focus on an
arbitrary individual i ∈ N . Because Wi (a, e) = Wi (b, e0), the indiﬀerence
curve of Ui through ai and U
0
i through bi are tangent to the same ‘shared
resources’ opportunity set defined by s. Given Ui, U
0
i ∈ U , both indiﬀerence
curves must cross at least once in R×[0, 1]. Choose a bundle αi where both cross.
Repeating this construction of αi for all individuals, we get an allocation α ∈ Z
such thatW (α, e) =W (a, e) =W (b, e0) =W (α, e0). In the same way, define
an allocation β ∈ Z such that W (β, e) = W (c, e) = W (d, e0) = W (β, e0).
Using Pareto Indiﬀerence and transitivity of Re and Re0 , we get:
(•) aRec⇔ αReβ and αRe0β ⇔ bRe0d.
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Using Utility Independence, we getαReβ ⇔ αRe0β. Using (•), we get aRec⇔ bRe0d,
establishing Neutrality.
Second, a rule f satisfies Neutrality if and only if there exists a unique ordering
R∗ defined over Rn, such that for each economy e ∈ E and for all allocations
z, z0 ∈ Z we have zRez0 if and only ifW (z, e) R∗ W (z0, e). Neutrality has to
be interpreted as follows: only well-being levels matter to rank two allocations
(given a fixed size n of the population and a fixed skill vector s). It suﬃces to
notice that our set-up is suﬃciently rich to obtain Neutrality: for any two well-
being vectors v,w ∈ Rn, there exist two allocations z, z0 ∈ Z and an economy
e ∈ E such thatW (z, e) = v andW (z0, e) = w.
Third, the unique ordering R∗ inherits certain properties from f : R∗ must satisfy
weak Pareto∗ (if vi>wi for all i ∈ N , then vP ∗w) and Anonymity∗ (vI∗π (v)
with π : N → N a permutation of individuals in N). This follows from Pareto
and Anonymity for f straightforwardly. We show that, given Compensation for
f , R∗ must also satisfy
Hammond Equity∗ (Hammond, 1976): For all well-being vectors v,w ∈ Rn
and for all individuals i, j ∈ N : If (i) wi < vi < vj < wj and (ii) vk = wk for all
























































Suppose the antecedent of Hammond Equity∗ holds, or there exist two well-being
vectors v,w ∈ Rn and two individuals i, j ∈ N such that wi < vi < vj < wj and
vk = wk for all k 6= i, j hold. The figure illustrates how it is possible to construct




j and a utility function Ui = Uj ∈ U such thatWi (z, e) =
vi, Wj (z, e) = vj andWi (z
0, e) = wi, Wj (z0, e) = wj and the antecedents of









j can be extended with bundles zk = z
0
k for the other individuals k 6= i, j
to obtain allocations z and z0, such thatWk (z, e) = vk = wk =Wk (z0, e) holds
for all k 6= i, j. Using Compensation, we must have zRez0 and hence vR∗w must
hold.
Finally, Given the axioms for R∗, Tungodden (2000, theorem 1) shows that
minv > minw implies vP ∗w for any vectors v,w ∈ Rn, which completes our
proof.
Appendix B: Proofs of propositions 1 and 2
To prove propositions 1 and 2, we need two ‘tricks’ and two lemmas. We start
with the tricks.
Consider an implementable and feasible allocation x ∈X as in figure B1. The
bundles xLL and xHH lie somewhere in the left and right shaded zone, respec-
tively, to satisfy the incentive constraints. The bundle x◦ is constructed to
satisfy VHL (x


























Figure B1: the allocations x and x+ illustrating trick 1.
Now, consider the allocation x+∈X with x+st = xst for all types st 6= HL
and x+HL is constructed by moving xHL on his indiﬀerence curve towards the
bundle x◦. It is clear that the allocation x+ is implementable. Furthermore,
given the preference technology defined by U , we have y+HL − c+HL > yHL −
cHL. Thus, the allocation x







st∈ST nst (yst − cst) = m > 0. The amount of money m can now be freely
redistributed to the net income of all types (while still satisfying all incentive
constraints) resulting in a weak Pareto improvement and thus also an improve-
ment according to the government’s program (∗). More generally, we obtain:
Trick 1: Consider an implementable and feasible allocation x ∈X and a type st
whose bundle xst can be moved along his indiﬀerence curve (i) without violating
incentive constraints and (ii) making an amount of money m free for redistri-
bution. The allocation x cannot be optimal according to program (∗), because
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everyone can be made strictly better-oﬀ (by redistributing the amount of money
m to the net incomes of all types), without violating incentive constraints.
To illustrate the second trick, consider an implementable and feasible allocation






























Figure B2: the allocation x and x+ illustrating trick 2.
Again, the bundle xHH lies somewhere in the right shaded zone to satisfy the in-
centive constraints. Now it is possible to construct a feasible and implementable
allocation x+∈X , transferring in x some net income from type LL to the other
types LH, HL and HH. Whether or not the resulting allocation is better ac-
cording to program (∗) ultimately depends on the well-being levels in society:
if LL is strictly better oﬀ compared to one of the other types, it is always pos-
sible to find an allocation x+ which is better according to program (∗). We
summarize
Trick 2: Consider an implementable and feasible allocation x ∈X and one
or more types st whose bundle(s) xst can be moved downwards (i) without
violating incentive constraints and (ii) making an amount of money m > 0
free for redistribution to the other types. The allocation x cannot be optimal
according to program (∗), if all donor type(s) st were strictly better oﬀ in x
compared to (one of) the other types.
Besides two tricks, we need two lemmas. The first lemma tells us that the
program (∗) can, loosely speaking, focus on the lower-skilled, because they are
always worse-oﬀ in terms of well-being, more precisely:
Lemma 1 : Consider two types with the same taste for working t ∈ T (and
thus the same utility function Ut ∈ U), but diﬀerent skills 0 ≤ L < H. In an
implementable allocation x ∈X , with VHt (xHt) ≥ VHt (xLt) (resp. VHt (xHt) >
VHt (xLt)) the lower-skilled type Lt is always worse oﬀ (resp. strictly worse oﬀ)
compared to the higher-skilled type Ht, i.e.,WHt (x) ≥WLt (x) (resp.WHt (x) >
WLt (x)).
Proof. Consider two types with the same taste for working t ∈ T . We prove the
case where skills satisfy 0 < L < H and VHt (xHt) ≥ VHt (xLt); the other cases
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are analogous. Call (cLt, yLt) and (cHt, yHt) their bundles. Individuals with the
same taste t have the same utility functions Ut and thus also the same indif-
ference curves and therefore the same well-being level for bundles on the same
indiﬀerence curve. Because our well-being measure is ordinally equivalent with

























. Because VHt (xHt) ≥


























given Ut ∈ U and 0 < L < H. ¤
Lemma 2 tells us that it cannot be optimal –according to the government’s
program (∗)– to treat the indistinguishable middle types LH and HL diﬀer-
ently in case y∗HL ≤ L. Otherwise (if y∗HL > L) it might be optimal to treat
them diﬀerently, but only under certain conditions:
Lemma 2 : Consider a four type economy with skills 0 < L < H and tastes
represented by utility functions UL, UH ∈ U , which satisfy single-crossingness
and indistinguishable middle type. Consider a government who optimizes the
program defined by (∗). In an optimal allocation x∗∈X , we must have:




HL ≤ L, or else,
(b). VHL (x
∗
LH) = VHL (x
∗
HL) , with y
∗
LH = L < y
∗
HL and MRSYHL (x
∗
HL) ≤ 1.
Proof of part (a). Suppose y∗HL ≤ L and x∗LH 6= x∗HL. We show that it is
always possible to construct another allocation x ∈X , which is feasible, imple-
mentable and strictly better than x∗ according to the government’s program




HL) ≥ VHL (x∗LH) and
VLH (x
∗
LH) ≥ VLH (x∗HL)⇔ VHL (x∗LH) ≥ VHL (x∗HL) ,
where the equivalence⇔ is due to indistinguishable middle types. We must have
VHL (x
∗






HL must lie on the same indiﬀerence
curve.
Given our preference technology U , there are only two cases for x∗LH 6= x∗HL.










HL; for the other case
x∗LH > x
∗
HL simply switch subscripts HL and LH in the sequel. Define a bundle
x◦ = (c◦, y◦) in R× [0, L] such that x◦ also lies on the same indiﬀerence curve
through x∗LH and x
∗
HL, i.e., VHL (x
◦) = VHL (x
∗
HL), and choose (i) y
◦ = 0, if
MRSYHL ≥ 1 everywhere in R×[0, L], (ii) y◦ = L, ifMRSYHL ≤ 1 everywhere
in R × [0, L], or else (iii) choose x◦ such that MRSYHL (x◦) = 1. Each case
leads to any of the following three cases: either (α) y◦ ≤ y∗LH < y∗HL, or (β)
y∗LH < y




HL ≤ y◦. In each of the three cases (α), (β)
and (γ), it is possible to use trick 1, by moving either x∗HL to the left on
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his indiﬀerence curve (in case (α) and (β)) or moving x∗LH to the right on his
indiﬀerence curve (in case (γ)), contradicting that x∗ was optimal.





y∗LH = L and MRSYHL (x
∗
HL) ≤ 1, must hold. Recall that, in case y∗HL > L,
the incentive constraint ICLH,HL does not exist, because type HL’s bundle is
not attainable for LH.





LH). Suppose not, i.e., VHL (x
∗
HL) > VHL (x
∗
LH). Single-crossingness en-
sures that VHL (x
∗
HL) > VHL (x
∗
LL) and thus LL is strictly worse-oﬀ compared
to HL (lemma 1); for the same reason, LH is strictly worse oﬀ than HH. Now,
it is possible to use trick 2, transferring from type HL (and possibly HH as
well if ICHL,HH binds) to both other types LL and LH, which must improve
the lowest well-being, contradicting that x∗ was optimal according to program
(∗).





HL, lie on the same indiﬀerence curve (of type HL), i.e.,
VHL (x
∗
LH) = VHL (x
∗
HL), but here y
∗
LH ≤ L < y∗HL. Now proceed as in part
(a). Define the bundle x◦ = (c◦, y◦) in R × [0,H] such that x◦ also lies on the
same indiﬀerence curve through x∗LH and x
∗
HL, i.e., VHL (x
◦) = VHL (x
∗
HL), and
choose (i) y◦ = 0, if MRSYHL ≥ 1 everywhere in R × [0,H], (ii) y◦ = H,
if MRSYHL ≤ 1 everywhere in R × [0,H], or else (iii) choose x◦ such that
MRSYHL (x
◦) = 1. Now, y◦ < y∗HL is not possible (otherwise we can use trick
1, moving x∗HL to the left on his indiﬀerence curve); thus MRSYHL (x
∗
HL) ≤ 1.
As a consequence y◦ ≥ y∗HL must hold. Now, y∗LH < L is not possible (because
then y∗LH < L < y
◦ and using trick 1 again, we could move x∗LH to the right on
his indiﬀerence curve). Thus y∗LH = L, which completes the proof. ¤
We are ready to prove propositions 1 and 2, on the basis of lemmas 1 and 2 and
tricks 1 and 2.
Proof of proposition 1
Consider a four type economy with skills 0 < L < H and tastes represented by
utility functions UL, UH ∈ U , which satisfy single-crossingness and indistinguish-
able middle type. Consider a government who optimizes the program defined
by (∗). In an optimal allocation x∗ ∈ X , we must have y∗LL− c∗LL ≥ y∗LH − c∗LH .
Our proof consists of two parts, depending on whether (a) y∗HL ≤ L in the
optimum x∗, or (b) y∗HL > L. Given the definition of X , one of both cases must
hold. We show, for both cases, that y∗LL − c∗LL < y∗LH − c∗LH is not possible.
Proof of part (a). Suppose y∗HL ≤ L (thus x∗LH = x∗HL via lemma 2) and
y∗LL−c∗LL < y∗LH−c∗LH . We consider four possible cases, depending on whether
ICLL,LH and/or ICLH,LL bind, or not. In an optimum x
∗ of the program (∗),
one of these four cases must hold. For all cases, we show that it is possible to
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construct a strictly better allocation according to the program (∗), which also
satisfies the feasibility and incentive compatibility constraints.





y∗LL − c∗LL < y∗LH − c∗LH .
2. ICLL,LH binds, ICLH,LL does not bind. 2a. If MRSYLL (x
∗
LL) < 1, we
could use trick 1 moving x∗LL somewhat to the right on his indiﬀerence curve.
2b. We must have MRSYLL (x
∗
LL) ≥ 1, from (2a). But, given the preference
technology defined by U , y∗LL−c∗LL < y∗LH−c∗LH is not possible, a contradiction.
3. ICLL,LH does not bind, ICLH,LL binds. 3a. Let us first focus on type LH. If





which violates y∗LL − c∗LL < y∗LH − c∗LH . So y∗LH > 0. If MRSYLH (x∗LH) > 1,
we can use trick 1 again by moving both x∗LH = x
∗
HL to the left on their
(common) indiﬀerence curve. SoMRSYLH (x∗LH) ≤ 1 must hold. 3b. We focus
now on type LL. We must have either (i) y∗LL = 0 or (ii) y
∗
LL > 0. In case
(ii), we have MRSYLL (x
∗
LL) ≤ 1 (otherwise we can use trick 1, moving x∗LL
somewhat to the left on his indiﬀerence curve). 3c. Due to lemma 1, either type
LH or LL has the minimal well-being. Figure B3 illustrates (3a), (3b(ii)) and
y∗LL − c∗LL < y∗LH − c∗LH ; type HH’s bundle is somewhere in the shaded zone.
We measure well-being in (c, y)- rather than in (c, `)-space. Therefore, one has
to divide the slopes of the shared resources budget line by the skill level of the
individual under consideration, here a low skilled individual. As a consequence,
it is easy to verify that type LH is always strictly worse-oﬀ compared to type
LL, irrespective of the proportion of high-skilled nHL+nHHn (which, multiplied
with L, defines the kink in the budget set where the slope changes from HL > 1

















































Figure B3: type LL is strictly better oﬀ compared to type LH .
Since ICLL,LH does not bind, it is always possible to use trick 2 transferring a
small amount of money from LL to the other types LH, HL andHH, improving
the minimal well-being in society, a contradiction.
4. ICLL,LH and ICLH,LL do not bind. Using trick 1, it can be verified that
only the following cases are possible: (i) y∗LL = 0 < y
∗






LH) ≤ 1, or (ii) 0 < y∗LL < y∗LH , MRSYLL (x∗LL) = 1 and
MRSYLH (x
∗
LH) ≤ 1. We are back in the same situation as in (3). In both
cases (i) and (ii) and given y∗LL − c∗LL < y∗LH − c∗LH , type LH is strictly worse-
oﬀ compared to LL irrespective of the proportion of high-skilled. Here again,
trick 2 can be used to obtain a contradiction.
Proof of part (b). Suppose y∗HL > L (thus VHL (x
∗
LH) = VHL (x
∗
HL), with
y∗LH = L < y
∗
HL and MRSYHL (x
∗
HL) ≤ 1 via lemma 2) and y∗LL − c∗LL <
y∗LH − c∗LH . It is again possible to consider four cases, depending on whether
ICLL,LH and/or ICLH,LL bind or not, and to show, for each case, a contradic-
tion. Actually, the proof is completely analogous as in steps 1-4 of part (a) and
therefore omitted.
Proof of proposition 2
Consider a four type economy with skills L = 0 < H and tastes represented
by utility functions UL, UH ∈ U , which satisfy single-crossingness and indis-
tinguishable middle type. Consider a government who optimizes the program
defined by (∗). In an optimal allocation x∗ ∈ X we must have y∗LL − c∗LL =
y∗LH − c∗LH ≤ y∗HL − c∗HL.
Proof. Suppose y∗LL− c∗LL = y∗LH − c∗LH > y∗HL− c∗HL holds. 1. Because L = 0
and x∗ ∈ X , we must have y∗LL = y∗LH = 0 and, given the incentive constraints,
also c∗LL = c
∗
LH must hold. 2. Due to lemma 1, the lowest well-being is either
LH or LL, thus, given (1), we must maximize the basic income, i.e., maximize
c∗LL = c
∗
LH . 3. y
∗





to incentive constraints) and y∗LH − c∗LH > y∗HL− c∗HL would be violated. 4. So,




HL must lie on the same indiﬀerence
curve, or VHL (x
∗
HL) = VHL (x
∗
LH). Otherwise (see the proof of lemma 2, part
(b)) it would be possible to improve the situation of the worst-oﬀ types LL and
LH, at the cost of the better-oﬀ types HL andHH (on the basis of trick 2). 5.
IfMRSYHL (x
∗
HL) > 1 at y
∗
HL > 0, we can use trick 1, moving x
∗
HL to the left
on his indiﬀerence curve. 6. To summarize, we must have MRSYHL (x∗HL) ≤ 1
and y∗HL > 0 while VHL (x
∗




LH = 0. But this contradicts
y∗LH − c∗LH > y∗HL − c∗HL, given our preference technology defined by U .
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Appendix C: The Belgian tax system for singles
pre-tax income y marginal tax rate (in %)
≤ 5032 0
5033 — 6272 25
6273 — 8304 30
8305 — 11849 40
11850 — 27268 45
27269 — 40902 50
40903 — 59990 52.5
> 59990 55
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Appendix D: Imputation via a sample selection
model
First, we present the variables used for imputing gross hourly wages σ and net
hourly benefits bh; afterwards, we show the estimates for both sample selection
models.
Imputing gross hourly wages σ
In the wage equation, the independent variables are:
• age and its square (age, agesq)
• educational dummies indicating the highest achieved education level of the
individual, starting from primary education (base case), lower secondary
education (dumeduc2 ), higher secondary education (dumeduc3 ), higher
education short type (dumeduc4 ), higher education long type (dumeduc5 )
• a gender dummy (sex ) taking the value of 1 for females
In the selection equation, the independent variables are:
• physical health dummies indicating the general health situation of the
individual, ranging from very good (base case), good (dumhealth2 ), rea-
sonable (dumhealth3 ), to bad (dumhealth4 )
• mental health dummies indicating how often the individual feels depressed,
ranging from never (base case), seldom (dumdepri2 ), at times (dumde-
pri3 ), regularly (dumdepri4 ), to frequently (dumdepri5 ); and how often
the individual longs for death, ranging from never (base case), seldom
(dumdeath2 ), at times (dumdeath3 ), regularly (dumdeath4 ), to frequently
(dumdeath5 )
• smoking dummies indicating smoking behaviour, ranging from never (base
case), occasionally (dumsmoke2 ), to daily (dumsmoke3 )
• care dummies indicating whether the individual has to take care for his
children (child) taking the value of 1 if aﬃrmative; and/or has to take
care of others (depperson) taking the value of 1 if aﬃrmative
• the independent variables of the wage equation
Imputing net hourly benefits bh
The dependent variable is the marginal benefit per hour bh =
b
2925 , with b the net
yearly benefit. The independent variables are identical to those in the Heckman
selection model imputing σ. In addition, we add in both the benefit and the
selection equation civil status dummies, indicating whether the individual is
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divorced (divorce), taking the value of 1 if aﬃrmative; widowed (widow), taking
the value of 1 if aﬃrmative; living together (cohabit), taking the value of 1 if
aﬃrmative.
Number of observations = 644, from which 136 censored and 508 un-
censored. Wald’s χ2 (7) = 265.68 with Pr > χ2 (7) = 0.00 and likeli-
hood ratio test of independent wage and selection equations results in
χ2 (1) = 4.66 with Pr > χ2 (1) = 0.031.

































































Number of observations = 638, from which 480 censored and 158 un-
censored. Wald’s χ2 (10) = 50.51 with Pr > χ2 (7) = 0.00 and likeli-
hood ratio test of independent benefit and selection equations results in
χ2 (1) = 7.09 with Pr > χ2 (1) = 0.008.













































































Appendix E: Some descriptive statistics
We report the number of observations (n), the minimum (min), the 25th per-
centile (p25), the median (p50), the 75th percentile (p75) and the maximum
(max) for the following variables: age, normalized labour `, observed gross
hourly wages σ, imputed gross hourly wages σˆ, observed and imputed gross
hourly wages (σ, σˆ), observed net hourly benefits bh, imputed net hourly bene-
fits bˆh and observed and imputed net hourly benefits (bh, bˆh).
n min p25 p50 p75 max
age 621 16 25 33 42 70
` 621 0.000 0.231 0.554 0.615 1.000
σ 502 1.495 9.585 11.864 15.700 38.271
σˆ 119 1.262 4.796 6.665 9.421 19.214
σ, σˆ 621 1.262 8.594 11.065 14.404 38.271
bh 143 0.166 0.915 1.849 3.051 3.661
bˆh 478 0.002 0.072 0.214 0.510 2.089
bh, bˆh 621 0.002 0.115 0.345 0.928 3.661
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Minimal rights based solidarity
Roland Iwan Luttens∗
Abstract
In a model where individuals with diﬀerent levels of skills exert diﬀerent
levels of eﬀort, we propose to use individuals’ minimal rights to divide an
extra amount of income generated by a change in the skill profile. Priority
is given to individuals with a positive minimal right. We characterize two
families of Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mechanisms that implement
this solidarity idea. One family guarantees each individual her claim when
claims are feasible. The other family guarantees a non-negative income
after redistribution for all individuals.
JEL Classification: D63.
Keywords: minimal rights, solidarity, compensation, claims.
1 Motivation
Suppose income inequalities are determined by unequal exerted eﬀort levels and
diﬀerent innate skills. The goal of fair income redistribution is to guarantee
an equal income for individuals exerting the same eﬀort and to perform equal
income transfers to individuals with equal skills. However, in many contexts,
there does not exist a redistribution mechanism that simultaneously satisfies
both requirements. We refer to Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2004) for an extensive
survey of this compensation problem. Weakening one of both requirements leads
to the proposition of diﬀerent (families of) redistribution mechanisms. Many
of these redistribution mechanisms rely on so called ‘reference’ income levels.
Typically, these reference income levels are computed by replacing either skill
levels or eﬀort levels by some reference value. Within one family of redistribution
mechanisms, diﬀerent mechanisms are distinguished by diﬀerent choices of the
reference value. The literature on fair income redistribution has some strong
similarities with the literature on bankruptcy problems and surplus sharing
problems. This becomes clear when reference income levels are interpreted as
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claims. In a bankruptcy problem, a fixed amount of money must be allocated
on the basis of monetary claims that sum up to more than can be divided. The
objective is to design allocation mechanisms that associate with each claims
problem a division of the amount available over the claimants. We refer to
Thomson (2003) for an extensive survey of the literature on competing claims
problems. In a surplus sharing problem, an amount of money that exceeds the
total sum of claims must be divided over all claimants. An extensive survey on
surplus sharing problems is Moulin (2002). Fair income redistribution problems
can be interpreted as competing claims (surplus sharing) problems where the
total sum of income before redistribution has to be divided over a population
of claimants that have reference incomes as claims.
In this paper we focus on two families of fair income redistribution mechanisms:
the family of Egalitarian Equivalent mechanisms due to Pazner and Schmeidler
(1978) and Fleurbaey (1995) and the family of Proportionally Adjusted Equiv-
alent mechanisms due to Iturbe (1997). These families are characterized in
Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2004) using diﬀerent strenghtenings of a compensation
axiom called ‘Solidarity’, in combination with a weak responsibility axiom called
‘Equal Transfer for Reference Skill’. The solidarity axioms describe solutions to
‘the solidarity problem’. The solidarity problem is a competing claims/surplus
sharing problem where a change in the skill profile generates an extra amount
(or a loss) of pre-tax income that has to be divided over (taken away from)
the population of claimants. Under an Egalitarian Equivalent mechanism these
extra resources are divided equally and hence diﬀerences in exerted eﬀort lev-
els are not taken into account. Under a Proportionally Adjusted Equivalent
mechanism diﬀerences in exerted eﬀort levels are taken into account by dividing
extra resources proportionally to claims. We propose to divide extra resources
on the basis of the information contained in individuals’ minimal rights. The
minimal right of an individual equals the amount that remains from the total
sum of pre-tax income when all other individuals receive their claim. Priority is
given to individuals with a higher claim, which is due to higher exerted eﬀort,
once the total sum of pre-tax income exceeds threshold levels where individu-
als’ minimal rights become positive. We characterize two families of Minimal
Rights based Egalitarian mechanisms that implement this solidarity idea. One
family also satisfies ‘Equal Transfer for Reference Skill’, while the other family
guarantees a non-negative income after redistribution for all individuals.
In the next section we present the model, state the compensation problem, de-
fine the diﬀerent families of fair income redistribution mechanisms, discuss their
characterizations and illustrate the income distributions that result from these
families. In section 3 we introduce the notion of minimal rights and propose to
use minimal rights to solve the solidarity problem. We state the solidarity ax-
ioms of ‘Symmetry’ and ‘Priority’ that together constitute the central solidarity
idea of this paper, Minimal Rights based Solidarity. We then characterize two
families of Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mechanisms. For a given reference
skill, we show that the family that guarantees all individuals a non-negative
income redistributes income more equally than the family that satisfies ‘Equal
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Transfer for Reference Skill’. This latter family is equivalent with the family of
Egalitarian Equivalent mechanisms in rich economies where all minimal rights
are positive, but redistributes income more equally in poorer economies where
some or all minimal rights are zero. We show that the axioms used in the
characterizations are independent. Section 4 summarizes our main conclusions.
2 Fair monetary compensation
2.1 The model
The fair monetary compensation model used in this paper is a one-dimensional
version of the quasi-linear model in Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2004) which is due
to Bossert (1995). Denote N = {1, . . . , n} the finite population of size n ≥ 2.
Let x ∈ R be an amount of transferable resource. The characteristic which
elicits compensation, hereafter called ‘skill’, is y ∈ Y and Y is an interval of R.
Denote yN = (y1, . . . , yn) the skill profile in the population. The characteristic
which does not elicit compensation, hereafter called ‘eﬀort’, is z ∈ Z and Z is
an interval of R. Eﬀort is not influenced by redistribution as incentive issues
are not taken up in the model. Denote zN = (z1, . . . , zn) the eﬀort profile
in the population. Without loss of generality, we assume that individuals are
ranked such that z1 ≥ z2 ≥ . . . ≥ zn. An economy e = (yN , zN ) is the pair of
characteristics’ profiles. Denote E the set of economies.
We assume that utility functions are quasi-linear as follows:
ui(xi, yi) = xi + v(yi, zi).
In the context of this paper ui(xi, yi) measures a monetary outcome, namely
final income after redistribution. The function v : Y × Z → R++ : (yi, zi) →
v(yi, zi) describes the pre-tax income function. We assume that v is continuous
and strictly increasing in y and z. Furthermore, we assume that v is not ad-
ditively separable in y and z, i.e. v(yi, zi) cannot be written as v1(yi) + v2(zi).
Denote R =
P
i∈N v(yi, zi) the total sum of pre-tax income.
Let the transferable resource xi be an element of an allocation xN = (x1, . . . , xn)
∈ Rn. We assume that the total amount to be distributed is 0, such that we
are looking at a pure redistribution problem. An allocation for the economy
e ∈ E is feasible when Pi∈N xi = 0. The set of feasible allocations is denoted
F . Notice that all feasible allocations are Pareto eﬃcient since we ruled out free
disposal in the definition of feasibility. The function S : E → F : e→ S(e) is an
allocation mechanism. Denote S the set of all allocation mechanisms.
Let y˜ ∈ Y be the reference skill. We assume throughout the paper that this
constant parameter is exogenously determined by the social planner. Denote
v(y˜, zi) the claim of individual i. It equals the pre-tax income that an individual
would receive when exerting her eﬀort level zi but having skill y˜ instead of
her own skill yi. We bring all claims together in a vector ν and denote C =
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P
i∈N v(y˜, zi) the total sum of claims . Define the interval Ycc = {y˜ ∈ Y :
C ≥ R}. For parameter values of y˜ in Ycc, the total sum of claims is at least
as high as the total sum of pre-tax income (which can be redistributed) and a
competing claims problem arises. A competing claims problem is a pair (ν, R) ∈
Rn++ ×R++, such that C ≥ R. Define the interval Yss = {y˜ ∈ Y : C < R}. For
parameter values of y˜ in Yss, the total sum of claims is not as high as the total
sum of pre-tax income and a surplus sharing problem arises. A surplus sharing
problem is a pair (ν, R) ∈ Rn++ ×R++, such that C < R.
2.2 The compensation problem
We state the two key axioms that express the ethical goal of fair income re-
distribution, namely neutralizing income inequalities due to y while preserving
income inequalities due to z.
The first axiom states that when two individuals only diﬀer in skill levels, both
should receive the same income after redistribution. An allocation mechanism
S satisfies ‘Equal Income for Equal Eﬀort’ (EIEE, Fleurbaey (1994)) if:
∀e ∈ E, xN ∈ S(e),∀i, j ∈ N,
zi = zj ⇒ xi + v(yi, zi) = xj + v(yj , zj).
Denote SEIEE the set of all allocation mechanisms that satisfy EIEE.
The second axiom states that when two individuals only diﬀer in exerted eﬀort
levels, they should be equally aﬀected by the performed redistribution. An
allocation mechanism S satisfies ‘Equal Transfer for Equal Skill’ (ETES,
Fleurbaey (1994)) if:
∀e ∈ E, xN ∈ S(e),∀i, j ∈ N,
yi = yj ⇒ xi = xj .
Denote SETES the set of all allocation mechanisms that satisfy ETES.
The compensation problem states that there does not exist an allocation mech-
anism that satisfies EIEE and ETES, i.e. SEIEE ∩ SETES = ∅. We refer to
Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2004) for a proof.
2.3 Allocation mechanisms
Weakening ETES or EIEE leads to the proposal of a number of interesting al-
location mechanisms. Two mechanisms that belong to SEIEE (and thus weaken
ETES) play an important role in this paper. We define them here. It concerns
a) the family of Egalitarian Equivalent mechanisms due to Pazner and Schmei-
dler (1978) and Fleurbaey (1995) and b) the family of Proportionally Adjusted
Equivalent mechanisms due to Iturbe (1997). Denote (xi)S the income transfer
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for an individual i from an allocation (xN )S ∈ S(e) of an allocation mechanism
S.
a) An y˜-Egalitarian Equivalent mechanism (Sy˜EE) allocates resources as follows:
∀e ∈ E,∀i ∈ N,
(xi)Sy˜EE = −v(yi, zi) + v(y˜, zi) + 1n(R− C).
b) An y˜-Proportionally Adjusted Equivalent mechanism (Sy˜PAE) allocates re-
sources as follows:
∀e ∈ E,∀i ∈ N,
(xi)Sy˜PAE = −v(yi, zi) + RC v(y˜, zi).
2.4 The characterizations of Sy˜EE and Sy˜PAE
2.4.1 ETRS
The axiom of ETES is weakened to only apply to economies where all skills are
equal to the reference skill. In these economies no redistribution is performed.
An allocation mechanism S satisfies ‘Equal Transfer for Reference Skill’
(ETRS, Fleurbaey (1995)) if:
∀e ∈ E, xN ∈ S(e),
[yi = y˜ ∀i ∈ N ]⇒ [xi = 0 ∀i ∈ N ].
Denote SETRS the set of all allocation mechanisms that satisfy ETRS. It is
easy to check that Sy˜EE and Sy˜PAE belong to SETRS.
2.4.2 Solidarity axioms
Solidarity axioms consider the eﬀect of a change in one individual’s skill on
the allocation. Consider two skill profiles yN = (y1, . . . , yk, . . . , yn) and y
0
N =
(y01, . . . , y0k, . . . , y
0





i, zi). Denote the change in total pre-tax income ∆R =
R0 − R. Without loss of generality, we assume throughout the paper that e0
yields more pre-tax income than e and hence∆R ∈ R++. The solidarity problem
is how ∆R should be divided over the population. Note that, as y˜ is constant,
a change in the skill profile does not alter individuals’ claims, i.e. ν equals ν0.
The axiom of EIEE is strengthened to an axiom that says that a change in the
skill profile should aﬀect all agents’ final incomes in the same direction.1 An
allocation mechanism S satisfies ‘Solidarity’ (Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2004))
if:
1We refer to Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2004) for a proof.
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∀e, e0 ∈ E, xN ∈ S(e), x0N ∈ S(e0),
[x0i + v(y
0
i, zi) ≥ xi + v(yi, zi) ∀i ∈ N ].
The axiom of Solidarity is easily defensible. As diﬀerences in the skill profile
elicit compensation, it is clear that changes in the skill profile should not make
some individuals gain income while others lose income.
2.4.3 Sy˜EE
Solidarity can be strengthened by stating that all incomes should change equally
due to a change in the skill profile. An allocation mechanism S satisfies ‘Additive
Solidarity’ (AS, Bossert (1995)) if:
∀e, e0 ∈ E, xN ∈ S(e), x0N ∈ S(e0),£
x0i + v(y
0
i, zi)− (xi + v(yi, zi)) = x0j + v(y0j , zj)− (xj + v(yj , zj)) ∀i, j ∈ N
¤
.
An allocation mechanism S satisfies ETRS and AS if and only if it is an Sy˜EE.
We refer to Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) for a proof.
When an Sy˜EE is implemented and the skill profile changes, ∆R is divided
equally over all individuals. However, eﬀort also determines ∆R. Therefore,
Sy˜EE can be criticized for not taking diﬀerences in exerted eﬀort into account
when dividing ∆R.
2.4.4 Sy˜PAE
Alternatively, Solidarity can be strengthened by requiring that all individuals’
outcomes change proportionally. An allocation mechanism S satisfies ‘Multiplicative
Solidarity’ (MS, Iturbe (1997)) if:
∀e, e0 ∈ E, xN ∈ S(e), x0N ∈ S(e0),£
(x0i + v(y
0




j , zj)) ∀i, j ∈ N
¤
.
An allocation mechanism S satisfies ETRS andMS if and only if it is an Sy˜PAE.
We refer to Iturbe (1997) for a proof.
When an Sy˜PAE is implemented and the skill profile changes, diﬀerences in eﬀort
are taken into account by dividing ∆R proportionally to individuals’ claims.








= v(y˜,zi)v(y˜,zj) for all i, j in N .
2
In this paper we propose to reward eﬀort in a diﬀerent way by giving, in the
division of ∆R, priority to the highest claims once the total sum of pre-tax
income exceeds a particular threshold level to be explained in section 3.
2We suppose that the denominator at the left hand side is diﬀerent from zero. As suchMS
is a strengthening of a strict version of Solidarity with a strict inequality sign in the definition.
74
2.5 Income distributions under Sy˜EE and Sy˜PAE
Figure 1 illustrates for every value of R the income distributions under an Sy˜EE
and an Sy˜PAE for an economy with four individuals whose claims are in a ratio of
6:4:2:1. As both redistribution mechanisms satisfy the axiom of ETRS, income
is redistributed such that every individual receives her claim when R equals C.
As a consequence of their respective solidarity axioms, when R changes, the
absolute income inequality remains constant under Sy˜EE (full line), while the













Figure 1: Income distributions under Sy˜EE and Sy˜PAE
3 Minimal rights based solidarity
3.1 Minimal rights
Rather than to base the division of ∆R on individuals’ claims, we propose to
use individuals’ minimal rights, a concept often used in the competing claims
literature originating from seminal contributions of O’Neill (1982) and Aumann
and Maschler (1985).3
The minimal right of an individual equals the amount that remains from the
total sum of pre-tax income when all other claimants have received their claim.
However, the minimal right is not allowed to be negative or to exceed the indi-
vidual’s own claim. Formally, we define the minimal right of an individual i as
follows:
3Minimal rights should not be confused with the concept of equal rights introduced in
Maniquet (1998). In a model with production, an allocation mechanism guarantees an equal
right when every individual weakly prefers her bundle over her best choice from a common
opportunity set.
75




j∈N\{i} v(y˜, zj) for all i in N .
Figure 2 shows that as long as R is smaller than C−1, all minimal rights are
zero. As soon as R exceeds C−1, the minimal right of the individual with eﬀort
level z1 becomes positive. As soon as R exceeds C−2, the minimal right of
the individual with eﬀort level z1 exceeds C−2 − C−1 and the minimal right
of the individual with eﬀort level z2 becomes positive. As R increases, more
and more individuals start to get a positive minimal right and as soon as R
exceeds C−n all minimal rights are positive. When R equals C (and thus claims
are feasible) every individual has a minimal right equal to her claim. When
R exceeds C minimal rights do not change anymore, so in all surplus sharing
problems mi (ν, R) equals v(y˜, zi) for all i in N .
-

























Figure 2: Aggregate resources, minimal rights and claims
Minimal rights could be given a ‘democratic’ interpretation. For a given y˜,
suppose that R equals C−2. Then all individuals in society agree that the
individual with eﬀort level z1 deserves at least her minimal right, i.e. C−2−C−1,
of R. Suppose that R equals C−3. Then there is agreement that the amount
C−2−C−1 should only go to the individual with eﬀort level z1, while the amount
C−3 − C−2 should be divided only over the individual with eﬀort level z1 and
the individual with eﬀort level z2. Since both individuals deserve the amount
C−3 − C−2, it seems natural to divide the amount C−3 − C−2 equally between
both individuals.
3.2 Solidarity axioms
We exploit these ideas in the statement of our solidarity axioms. When the skill
profile changes, it is clear that none, some or all minimal rights may change.
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Denote ∆mi (ν, R,∆R) = mi (ν, R+∆R)−mi (ν, R) the change in the minimal
right of individual i due to a change of total pre-tax income equal to ∆R.
These changes in minimal rights could be informative for the division of ∆R.
Suppose that R and R0 are smaller than C−1. Since all minimal rights are zero
before and after the change in the skill profile, it seems reasonable to divide
∆R equally over all individuals. Suppose now that R0 further increases to C−2.
Then priority could be given to the individual with eﬀort level z1 who receives
C−2 − C−1 –an amount equal to the change in her minimal right– while the
rest, C−1 − R, is divided equally over all individuals. Suppose now that R0
further increases to C−3. Then the amount C−1 − R could be divided equally
over all individuals, because nobody has a positive minimal right up to income
level C−1. Then priority could be given to the individual with eﬀort level z1
who additionally receives C−2−C−1 because there is no other individual with a
positive minimal right from income level C−1 up to income level C−2. Finally,
the amount C−3 − C−2 could be divided equally between the individual with
eﬀort level z1 and the individual with eﬀort level z2 because they are the only
individuals with a positive minimal right from income level C−2 up to income
level C−3. This iterative process can be continued as R
0 increases until R0
exceeds C−n. As all individuals have a positive minimal right after the income
level C−n and their minimal rights change equally between C−n and R
0, it seems
reasonable to divide R0 −C−n again equally over all individuals. The following
axioms express these ideas.
The first axiom weakens Additive Solidarity by requiring an equal treatment in
the allocation of ∆R only when minimal rights change equally. A redistribution
mechanism S satisfies ‘Symmetry’ if:4
∀e, e0 ∈ E, xN ∈ S(e), x0N ∈ S(e0),∀i, j ∈ N,
∆mi (ν, R,∆R) = ∆mj (ν, R,∆R)
⇒ x0i + v(y0i, zi)− (xi + v(yi, zi)) = x0j + v(y0j , zj)− (xj + v(yj , zj)).
The second axiom is inspired by the idea that individuals whose minimal rights
change should be given priority over individuals whose minimal rights do not
change in the allocation of ∆R once not all minimal rights are equal to zero.
Denote N1 = {i ∈ N |∆mi (ν, R,∆R) > 0} the set of individuals whose minimal
rights change due to a change of R. A redistribution mechanism S satisfies
‘Priority’ if:
∀e, e0 ∈ E, xN ∈ S(e), x0N ∈ S(e0),





i, zi)− xi − v(yi, zi)) = ∆R.
4Note that, as minimal rights do not change anymore in surplus sharing problems, ETRS
and Symmetry characterize the y˜-Egalitarian Equivalent mechanism for y˜ ∈ Yss (see 2.4.3).
In the surplus sharing literature, this mechanism is better known as the Equal Surplus Sharing
mechanism: every claimant receives her claim plus an equal share of the surplus.
77
Symmetry and Priority together express the paper’s central solidarity idea of
Minimal Rights based Solidarity, i.e. it explains how ∆R should be divided over
the population. When all minimal rights change equally, Symmetry implies
that ∆R is divided equally. As the pre-tax income function v is continuous and
strictly increasing in y, there exist unique intermediary skill levels such that,
when changes in minimal rights diﬀer, ∆R can be divided in specific subchanges.
For each of these subchanges of ∆R, the population is partitioned in two groups:
(i) a group whose change in minimal rights equals the subchange of ∆R and
(ii) a group whose minimal rights do not change. Symmetry implies that within
each group all individuals are treated in the same way, whereas Priority requires
that the first group receives the subchange of ∆R. Hence, the subchange of ∆R
is equally divided among the individuals of the first group. We state Minimal
Rights based Solidarity formally in appendix.
3.3 Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mechanisms
In the previous subsection Minimal Rights based Solidarity described how to di-
vide ∆R. We call fair income redistribution mechanisms that satisfy Symmetry
and Priority Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mechanisms. In order to charac-
terize one particular family of Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mechanisms,
it suﬃces to combine the solidarity axioms of Symmetry and Priority with an
axiom that for one specific R implies one specific income distribution.
3.3.1 Sy˜MRE/E
The axiom of ETRS states that when R equals C every individual should
receive her claim. Combining Symmetry, Priority and ETRS characterizes the
following mechanism.
An y˜-Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mechanism Sy˜MRE/E allocates resources
as follows:
∀e ∈ E,
(1) when C−n ≤ R :
(xi)Sy˜MRE/E = −v(yi, zi) + v(y˜, zi) + R−Cn for all i in N ,
(2) when, for k ≤ n− 1, C−k ≤ R < C−(k+1) :












for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and









for all j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n− 1} and
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(xn)Sy˜MRE/E = −v(yn, zn) + v(y˜, zn) +
C−n−C
n ,
(3) when R < C−1 :










for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and





Proposition 1 : ∀e ∈ E : S = Sy˜MRE/E ⇔ S satisfies Symmetry, Priority
and ETRS.
The proof of proposition 1 can be found in appendix.
Figure 3 depicts for every value of R the income distributions under an Sy˜MRE/E
for the same economy as in figure 1.
-
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Figure 3: Income distributions under Sy˜MRE/E
As Sy˜MRE/E also satisfies ETRS, income is redistributed such that every indi-
vidual receives her claim when R equals C. When, due to a change in the skill
profile, R becomes higher than C, every individual receives her claim plus an
equal part of R− C. When R becomes lower than C, every individual receives
an income that is lower than her claim, but the shortfall from the claim is never
lower for individuals with a higher claim. As long as R is higher than C−4,
the loss of total pre-tax income is equally borne by all individuals. But, when
R falls below C−4, the income of the poorest individual is left constant, which
brings about an extra loss of income for all other individuals. When R becomes
smaller than C−3, the incomes of the poorest and second poorest individuals
remain constant and, when R falls below C−2, the richest individual alone is
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saddled with the entire cost of keeping the incomes of all other individuals con-
stant. When R becomes smaller than C−1, the loss of total pre-tax income is
again borne equally by all individuals.
Some general conclusions can be drawn from comparing figures 1 and 3. We
say that, in the comparison of two income distributions A and B with the same
mean, A is more equal than B when A is obtained from B by performing a
series of (Pigou-Dalton) rich-to-poor transfers that do not entail rank reversals.
- In economies where every individual has a strictly positive minimal right
(C−n < R), an Sy˜MRE/E redistributes income just like an Sy˜EE. Both mecha-
nisms redistribute income more equally than an Sy˜PAE as soon as R is larger
than C.
- In economies where some but not all minimal rights are strictly positive (C−1 <
R ≤ C−n), the income distribution under an Sy˜MRE/E is more equal than the
income distribution under an Sy˜EE.
- In economies where all minimal rights are zero (R ≤ C−1), absolute income
inequalities remain constant under an Sy˜MRE/E and under an Sy˜EE when R
changes, but incomes are more equally distributed under the former mechanism.
Note that the incomes of the individuals with the highest and second highest
eﬀort level coincide under an Sy˜MRE/E in these economies.
3.3.2 Sy˜MRE/P
Figures 1 and 3 show a debatable property of Sy˜EE and Sy˜MRE/E: the poorest
individuals might end up with a negative income after redistribution in poor
societies (i.e. when R is suﬃciently low). Our ethical intuition may lead us to
consider a minimal amount of redistribution that we at least want to perform.
Suppose that the poorest in society could not satisfy their basic needs when they
receive a negative income after redistribution. Society wants to exclude this pos-
sibility in every situation by incorporating the requirement of a non-negative
income after redistribution for all individuals in the construction of the redis-
tribution mechanism. A redistribution mechanism S satisfies ‘Participation’
(Maniquet (1998)) if:
∀e ∈ E, xN ∈ S(e),
xi + v(yi, zi) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N .
An implication of Participation is that, when R converges to zero, all incomes
should also converge to zero. Combining Participation with the solidarity ax-
ioms of Symmetry and Priority characterizes the following mechanism.
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An y˜-Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mechanism Sy˜MRE/P allocates resources
as follows:
∀e ∈ E,
(1) when R < C−1 :
(xi)Sy˜MRE/P = −v(yi, zi) + Rn for all i in N ,
(2) when, for k ≤ n− 1, C−k ≤ R < C−(k+1) :












for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and
(xj)Sy˜MRE/P = −v(yj , zj) +
C−1
n for all j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n},
(3) when C−n ≤ R :










for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and





Proposition 2 : ∀e ∈ E : S = Sy˜MRE/P ⇔ S satisfies Symmetry, Priority and
Participation.
The proof of proposition 2 can be found in appendix.
Figure 4 illustrates, for the same economy as in figures 1 and 3, the income
distributions under Sy˜MRE/P .
-
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Figure 4: Income distributions under Sy˜MRE/P
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An Sy˜MRE/P redistributes incomes very equally. It is easy to check that, for
every value of R, the income distribution under Sy˜MRE/P is more equal than the
income distribution under Sy˜MRE/E . An equal distribution of income prevails
as long as all minimal rights are zero. More generally, when R is lower than or
equal to C−i for some i in N , all individuals with z lower than or equal to zi
receive the same income. However, one could argue that too much redistribution
is performed. Figure 4 shows that when all individuals have y equal to y˜ and
hence only diﬀer with respect to their responsibility characteristic z (such that
no redistribution is needed), Pigou-Dalton transfers are still performed. As
Sy˜MRE/E and Sy˜MRE/P are diﬀerent mechanisms, Participation is incompatible
with ETRS when Symmetry and Priority are imposed.
3.3.3 Discussion
We end this section by discussing that the incompatibility between Participation
and ETRS when Symmetry and Priority are imposed, is due to Symmetry
rather than Priority. We also show that the axioms used in propositions 1 and
2 are independent.
When Priority is dropped, imposing Participation, Symmetry and ETRS still
leads to an incompatibility, except when the lowest n − 1 responsibility char-
acteristics are equal. This is most easily explained as follows. Start from an
income distribution (0, 0, . . . , 0) when R converges to zero (Participation). Now
suppose R0 equals C. Then ETRS requires that every individual receives her
claim. Hence, the individual with eﬀort level zn should in that case receive
v(y˜, zn). Symmetry requires that the subchanges of ∆R for which all minimal
rights change equally, i.e. C−1 and C − C−n (= v(y˜, zn)), are divided equally
over the entire population. Given our assumptions about the pre-tax income
function v, the condition 1nC−1 +
1
nv(y˜, zn) = v(y˜, zn) can only hold when
z2 = z3 = . . . = zn. Note the ineﬀectiveness of restricting the range of choices
of y˜ the social planner can make, as the incompatibility between Symmetry,
Participation and ETRS holds for every value of y˜.
When Symmetry is dropped, Participation, Priority and ETRS are compatible
but do not characterize a unique redistribution mechanism. Figure 5 illustrates
two diﬀerent mechanisms that satisfy Participation, Priority and ETRS. When
R falls below C both mechanisms first reduce the income of the poorest indi-
vidual to zero. But, as soon as R falls below C−1, the first mechanism (full
line) in turn reduces the income of the second poorest, second richest and rich-
est individual respectively to zero, whereas the second mechanism (dotted line)
first equalizes the incomes of the three individuals and afterwards reduces their
incomes by equal amounts.
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Figure 5: Two diﬀerent mechanisms satisfying Participation, Priority and ETRS
The axioms used in the characterization of Sy˜MRE/E are independent. For
example, Sy˜EE satisfies ETRS and Symmetry but violates Priority. The two
mechanisms of figure 5 satisfyETRS and Priority but violate Symmetry. Sy˜MRE/P
satisfies Symmetry and Priority but violates ETRS. The axioms used in the
characterization of Sy˜MRE/P are also independent. A straightforward example
of a mechanism that satisfies Participation and Symmetry but violates Prior-
ity is the equal division of income. The two mechanisms of figure 5 satisfy
Participation and Priority but violate Symmetry. Finally, Sy˜MRE/E satisfies
Symmetry and Priority but violates Participation.
4 Conclusion
The choice of a particular mechanism to divide the sum of total pre-tax income
over a population of claimants inextricably brings about a particular way to
solve the solidarity problem. We propose to use the information of individuals’
minimal rights to divide an extra amount of income generated by a change
in the skill profile. The idea is to give priority to individuals with a positive
minimal right. We present Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mechanisms that
implement this solidarity idea. We contrast Egalitarian Equivalent mechanisms
(Sy˜EE) and Proportionally Adjusted Equivalent mechanisms (Sy˜PAE), two well
known families of fair redistribution mechanisms presented in the literature,
with two families of Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mechanisms (Sy˜MRE/E
and Sy˜MRE/P ). The following table summarizes our axiomatic analysis into the
properties of these mechanisms.
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Sy˜EE Sy˜PAE Sy˜MRE/E Sy˜MRE/P
EIEE + + + +
ETES − − − −
ETRS F F F −
Solidarity + + + +
AS F − − −
MS − F − −
Symmetry + − F F
Priority − − F F
Participation − + − F
F: used in characterization of S
+: S satisfies the axiom (but not used in characterization)
−: S violates the axiom
The study into the income inequalities resulting from these mechanisms learns
that, given y˜, an Sy˜MRE/P always redistributes income more equally than an
Sy˜MRE/E . The latter mechanism redistributes income more equally than an
Sy˜EE when none or some (but not all) minimal rights are positive. When
all minimal rights are positive Sy˜EE and Sy˜MRE/E are equivalent. All three
mechanisms redistribute income more equally than an Sy˜PAE in surplus sharing
problems.
Appendix: Proofs
Lemma 1 states formally the solidarity idea of Minimal Rights based Solidar-
ity, i.e. how a change in the total sum of pre-tax income is divided over the
population such that the axioms of Symmetry and Priority are satisfied.
Lemma 1 (Minimal Rights based Solidarity): Consider ∆R > 0 due to a
skill change from yi to y
0





(xi + v(yi, zi));
P
i∈N di = ∆R. One of five possible situations occurs:
(1) when R0 ≤ C−1 or C−n ≤ R :
di =
∆R
n for all i in N ,
(2) when, for k ≤ n− 1, C−k ≤ R < R0 < C−(k+1) :
di =
∆R
k for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and
dj = 0 for all j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n},
(3) when, for k ≤ n − 1, C−k ≤ R < C−(k+1) and, for 2 ≤ l ≤ n, C−l ≤ R0 <
C−(l+1)












l for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and















dq = 0 for all q ∈ {l + 1, . . . , n},












l for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l} and
dj =
C−1−R
n for all j ∈ {l + 1, . . . , n},


















Proof. Suppose the antecedent of (1) is true. None of the minimal rights
change and the division of∆R is obtained by Symmetry. Suppose the antecedent
of (2) is true. There are two groups of individuals. For individuals 1 to k minimal
rights change equally. For individuals k+ 1 to n minimal rights do not change.
Symmetry implies that, within each group, all individuals are treated in the
same way. Priority requires that the first group receives ∆R. The division of
∆R then follows straightforwardly. Suppose the antecedent of (3) is true. As
v is continuous and strictly increasing in y, there exist for individual i unique
intermediary skill levels yˆki , yˆ
k+1
i , . . . , yˆ
l
i such that, ceteris paribus, the total sum
of pre-tax income equals C−k, C−(k+1), . . . , C−l respectively. Now consider skill










i such that the total change of
pre-tax income equals C−k −R,C−(k+1) −C−k, . . . , R0 −C−l respectively. For
each of these subchanges there are two groups of individuals: (i) a group whose
change in minimal rights is equal to the subchange and (ii) a group whose
minimal rights do not change. Symmetry implies that within each group all
individuals are treated in the same way, whereas Priority requires that the first
group receives the subchange. Hence, the subchange is equally divided among
the individuals of the first group. The division of ∆R is obtained from applying
Symmetry and Priority to the division of these subchanges. The division of ∆R
under (4) and (5) is obtained by similar reasoning as in (3). ¥
Proof of proposition 1
∀e ∈ E : S = Sy˜MRE/E ⇔ S satisfies Symmetry, Priority and ETRS.
Proof. We only proof (⇐). Define an economy e˜ = ((y˜, . . . , y˜), (z1, . . . , zn)).
By ETRS, x˜i = 0 for all i in N and individuals’ final incomes are equal to their
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claims. Call this the ‘initial income distribution’. Rather than successively con-
sidering n changes from y˜ to yi for every i in N and using Lemma 1 successively
to divide the intermediate subchanges in total pre-tax income (a process where
in many cases previous subchanges in total pre-tax income would cancel out),
we immediately use Lemma 1 to divide ∆R = C − R.6 The transfers of (1) in
the definition of Sy˜MRE/E then follow from adding to the initial income distri-
bution the transfers described in case (1) in lemma 1. The transfers of (2) then
follow from subtracting of the initial income distribution the transfers described
in case (3) with l = n in lemma 1. The transfers of (3) then follow from sub-
tracting of the initial income distribution the transfers described in case (5) in
lemma 1. ¥
Proof of proposition 2
∀e ∈ E : S = Sy˜MRE/P ⇔ S satisfies Symmetry, Priority and Participation.
Proof. We only proof (⇐). Participation requires that, when R converges
to zero, all incomes also converge to zero. Let (0, 0, . . . , 0) be the initial income
distribution. Now, use Lemma 1 to divide ∆R = R − 0. The transfers of (1)
in the definition of Sy˜MRE/P are then described in case (1) in lemma 1. The
transfers of (2) are then described in case (4) in lemma 1. The transfers of (3)
are then described in case (5) in lemma 1. ¥
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